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Executive Summary
In order to effectively harness public funds and leverage them to support sustainable development,
governments have to be strategic in their use of capital. This means ensuring that government
funds are used to help compensate for market failures that lead to the underproduction of public
goods. It also means ensuring that government funds are not used to provide redundant support for
private actors and subsidize environmentally or socially harmful activities.
To achieve these policy objectives, governments need to be careful and deliberate in their use of
investment incentives. Investment incentives, which may be defined (broadly) as nonmarket
advantages used to influence the behavior of an economic actor, can represent significant costs to
governments. These costs have the potential to generate various public benefits such as increased
employment, development and dissemination of environmentally and socially sound technology,
and other positive externalities. However, investment incentives are not often tailored or
implemented in ways that ensure they produce the desired outcomes, or they do so at public costs
that are less than their public benefits.
Investment incentives have the potential to advance sustainable development but can also be
misused, undermining their goals, and wasting public funds. This report provides an overview of
investment incentives, their policy implications, and strategies for understanding and managing
their costs and benefits.
Data Limitations on the Use of Investment Incentives
Investment incentives have been widely and increasingly used by governments in the developing
and developed world. Various studies reviewed in the report provide a picture of where and how
they are used. The report, however, notes that there are significant limitations on the public
availability of data on investment incentives. Largely due to the discretionary and frequently
opaque nature through which many incentives are granted, it is extremely challenging to develop
a complete picture of the amounts and types of incentives being awarded. Apart from rules on
State Aid in the EU and efforts by some subnational entities, information regarding the use of
incentives is not systematically collected or disclosed, which hinders research and analysis of
associated policy issues and solutions.
Types of Investment Incentives
Investment incentives can be divided into four types:
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•

Fiscal incentives – tax-based measures; provide exemptions from or reductions of
government revenue which would otherwise be due.1

•

Financial incentives – financial support that is non-taxed based. Forms include the
provision of certain goods and services; transfer of funds or liabilities; transfer of funds
through instruments such as grants or loans; and payments in kind.2

•

Regulatory incentives – derogations from the rules and regulations of certain national or
subnational rules and regulations.3

•

Technical and business support incentives – advisory services provided to ease entry or
support the operations of firms.

While we recognize four types of investment incentives, this report focuses on tax incentives and,
to a lesser extent, on financial incentives.
Reasons for Using Investment Incentives
The use of incentives might be motivated by the desire to attract or keep investment and to help
ensure that the investment advances certain policy aims. More specifically, from a public policy
perspective, there are four main situations providing an economic rationale for the use of
investment incentives:
•

Public goods

Public goods are generally defined as goods or services that benefit society. They are frequently
provided free of charge and financed by direct taxation or a subsidy to private spending.
•

Positive externalities

In broad terms, a positive externality is a positive effect that a particular activity has on an unrelated
third party. It can occur on either the production or consumption side of things. For example, an
educated population is statistically associated with lower crime, higher property value (ergo higher
property tax), and better-informed voters. Governments are therefore compelled to subsidize the
education industry because of all of these positive externalities.
•

Credit market failures

1

James, Sebastian. 2009. “Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications.” Investment Climate
Advisory Services of the World Bank Group.
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/27875/588160WP0Incen10BOX353820B01PUBLIC
1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, 1
2
Ibid.
3
OECD. 2003. Checklist for Foreign Direct Investment Incentive Policies. 17.
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Even economists couldn’t agree on the nature of market failures and what measures should be
taken to prevent them. Reallocation of resources or a change in the incentive structure are
frequently used for addressing credit market failures.
•

Private firm risk aversion4

Risk-averse private firms are frequently regarded as prioritizing the safety of their principal over
the prospect of a higher return on their investment. However, companies, at least in theory, should
create value for stakeholders by taking risks and reaching higher returns. The corporate tax system
is frequently used to incentivize risky business decisions.
Effectiveness of Investment Incentives
The effectiveness of incentives on an investor’s investment decision varies based on the nature of
the investor’s business and its strategies. Firms seeking to enter new markets or acquire natural
resources (or other resources and strategic assets), for example, appear less motivated by locational
tax incentives than highly mobile, efficiency-seeking firms that seek to reduce costs for
manufacturing products or producing services destined for a global market. Tax incentives may
also be important for market-seeking investment if the investment decision is contingent on
determining where to locate among similarly attractive platforms or similarly attractive parts of
one large market. A number of studies indicate that incentives seeking to influence location
decisions are relatively less important than other characteristics of a host country and are often
unable to compensate for an unattractive investment climate.
Effectively Designing Tax Incentive Programs
Proper Targeting of Incentives. A starting point for any incentive discussion needs to address the
targeting of businesses for incentives. Many incentive programs target businesses that are unlikely
to be influenced by incentive offers. This includes companies for which investment decisions are
likely to be determined primarily based on geographic constraints, like the location of a resource
deposit or an existing production facility.
Other incentives may indeed influence investment decisions but result in limited economic
development benefits for broader communities or countries. For example, incentives for new
businesses that displace existing businesses, investments with few linkages to other parts of the
economy like sports stadiums, or investments that generate few full-time or permanent jobs for
residents like film and TV production, may not be optimally targeted to encourage economic
development.
The challenge of cost-benefit analysis. To understand whether it is strategic to use incentives in a
particular country, it is necessary to assess the costs and benefits of those potential incentives.
4

See Lovallo, Dan, Tim Koller, Robert Uhlaner, and Daniel Kahneman. 2003. “Your Company Is Too Risk-Averse.”
Harvard Business Review. https://hbr.org/2020/03/your-company-is-too-risk-averse
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With respect to tax incentives, for example, governments should take stock of the direct fiscal
costs of revenue losses from giving tax benefits to investors that would have invested in their
absence. They should also measure incentives’ indirect costs. These are more difficult to
measure but can include “distortions created by encouraging new investments that are not
economically viable or that are detrimental to existing ones,” as well as “time and money spent
by businesses lobbying for,” “qualifying for, and obtaining tax incentives.”5
Meanwhile, the benefits from incentives can also be direct or indirect: direct benefits might include
contributions to job creation, whereas indirect benefits might include effects that encourage
investments in environmentally friendly technologies.
One narrow but somewhat simplistic approach to cost-benefit analysis is to assess the jobs created
as a result of tax incentives. While less comprehensive than other techniques for assessing the costs
and benefits of these tools, the main advantage of this type of analysis is that it may be relatively
easy for a government to conduct. It also provides a rough figure that can help policymakers decide
if the incentive is worthwhile. A number of country studies have shown the cost per job of
investment incentives is often quite high. For instance, a World Bank Group study of a project in
El Salvador found the cost of incentives per job to be US$2,084, more than half of El Salvador’s
per capita Gross National Income. A method to calculate the jobs created as a result of tax
incentives is presented in this report, along with other techniques for conducting cost-benefit
analyses on incentive packages.
Many incentive evaluations erroneously attribute 100% of the jobs of a firm to granted incentives.
However, a review of existing literature on U.S. incentive programs suggests that only 2% to 25%
of investment decisions are decisively influenced by incentive packages.6 Governments can build
this research into evaluations: for example, the U.S. state Rhode Island provides costs-benefit
analysis estimates assuming that 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% of investments are due to the
incentives offered.7 Policymakers can use such estimates to further refine and apply their costbenefit analyses.
In addition to the costs incurred and benefits provided by the granting jurisdiction, incentives can
also have (“external”) impacts on other jurisdictions. Incentives might, for instance, indirectly
impose costs on other jurisdictions by exposing them to investment policy “races to the bottom,”
or by causing them to lose tax revenue due to transfer pricing practices. Yet incentives can also
provide external benefits: incentives might be used to encourage outward investment in areas or
5

James, Sebastian. 2010. “Providing Incentives for Investment: Advice for Policymakers in Developing Countries.”
Investment Climate in Practice: Investment Policy and Promotion. 3.
6
Barik, Timothy. 2018. ‘But For’ Percentages for Economic Development Incentives: What percentage estimates
are plausible based on the previous research. Upjohn Institute Working Paper 18-289.
7
Raimondo, Gina M. 2018. “Economic Development Tax Incentives Evaluation Act: Evaluation of ‘Motion Picture
Production Tax Credits’ (R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-31.2-5) Tax Years 2013 through 2015.” State of Rhode Island and
Providence Plantations: Office of Revenue Analysis.
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activities in which investment might not otherwise be made, generating positive spillovers in
home, host, and even third countries. Many states already recognize this potential for positive and
negative effects outside the granting jurisdiction: the EU rules regarding State Aid, for example,
consider the effects of Member States’ incentives policies on other states within the EU. Another
relevant example can be found in the practice of the U.S. agency providing incentives for outward
investment, which assesses the effects – both at home and abroad – of the investments it supports.8
Administration and implementation challenges. Incentives create a number of risks. They can
encourage lobbying and rent-seeking, facilitate tax evasion, and exacerbate challenges related to
the administration of the incentives scheme or program. In particular, financial incentives present
unique challenges: their many policy objectives can make it hard to calculate benefits, and they
tend to be administered by different authorities, come in varied forms, and may be offered on a
discretionary basis, making them more apt to abuse.
Drawing from the literature and building on the discussion of the report, there are 12 guiding
principles that represent international best practice for the effective design and implementation of
investment incentives, with a focus on fiscal and financial tools. These are:
1) Incentives, both tax and financial, should only be used as focused instruments to correct
market failures and as a second-best policy option after having evaluated the alternatives
available.
2) Incentives should be part of a broader and consistent investment attraction or influencing
strategy.
3) Incentives programs should be time-bound.
4) Incentives programs should be reviewed regularly to ensure that they continue to remain
relevant and effective.9
5) Information on the processes and procedures related to incentives administration should be
transparent and publicly available.

8

See, e.g., U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). 2013. “Self-Monitoring Questionnaire for Finance,
Insurance,
Reinsurance,
and
Investment
Funds
Projects,
Form
OPIC-162.”
http://www.opic.gov/sites/default/files/files/OPIC-162-FY2012-SMQ-FOR-PUBLIC%20USE.pdf; OPIC. 2013.
“Office of Investment Policy Questionnaire, Form-248.” http://www.opic.gov/sites/default/files/files/OPIC-248-OIPQuestionnaire.pdf Note, OPIC was replaced in 2018 by a new federal entity playing similar functions, the U.S.
International Development Finance Corporation. See 22 USC §§ 9601–9689.
9
While stability is important, predictable flexibility ensured by mandatory reviews is preferable to maintain effective
incentives.
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6) The process of applying for incentives should be simple and minimize discretion, and for
tax incentives it should be automatic.
7) Incentive programs should have a statutory cap, limiting the total dollars allocated to a
program.
With specific regard to tax incentives:10
8) As much as possible, they should be linked to investment levels, while tax holidays should
be used sparingly.
9) They should be provided in the relevant tax code.
10) Tax returns, declarations, and relevant forms should be filed on a regular basis as a precondition for investors.
11) Tax expenditure statements should be prepared regularly to measure the costs of tax
incentives.
12) Incentives are more effective when they are offered up for short time periods, as opposed
to offered over a long time period. As a general rule, tax incentives offered longer than 5
years are excessively costly.
Reducing Incentives Competition – Regulatory Effects to Limit ‘Races to the Bottom’
While a winning location may reap near-term benefits from securing an investment, it does so at a
cost that is likely higher than it would have been absent any incentives competition. This can lead
to a situation in which the offer and receipt of incentives become the norm rather than the
exception, benefiting investors at the expense of general welfare. Addressing these issues,
however, is a problem requiring collective action. There are treaties that address these problems
and restrict the use of trade-distorting practices by making certain government support or
assistance impermissible. For example, members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) may
invoke several of the WTO’s “covered agreements” to discipline the use of investment incentives
(both financial and regulatory) that government entities may introduce to attract investment.
Outside the WTO framework, the EU has a relatively robust legal framework governing the use of
incentives by EU member states.
Concrete Areas for Action

10

Adapted from the United Nations Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, Secretariat
Note On Agenda Item - Use Of Tax Incentives In Attracting Foreign Direct Investment, Geneva, 18-22 October 2010.
https://docplayer.net/52303652-Secretariat-note-on-agenda-item-use-of-tax-incentives-in-attracting-foreign-directinvestment.html
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While current knowledge regarding the use of investment incentives is limited, this report seeks to
lay the foundation for renewed attention to the use of incentives. Actions by individual granting
jurisdictions are necessary to ensure that incentives advance identified policy objectives and that
their benefits justify their costs. Collective action to rein in incentives competition is also required,
as individual jurisdictions acting alone fear – often mistakenly – that they will lose out to
competing jurisdictions if they curtail their use of incentives. Against that backdrop, the report
identifies concrete areas for action, such as:
•

increasing the transparency of investment incentives;

•

transitioning to a rule-based, as opposed to ad hoc, system for granting incentives;

•

ensuring incentives arrangements build in mechanisms for monitoring, oversight, and
enforcement so that they actually advance intended policy objectives;

•

building capacity to perform proper cost-benefit analyses to ensure that incentives do not
dilute, eliminate, or even outweigh the potential benefits of an investment project;

•

mandating regular reviews of incentive programs, with the review criteria specified prior
to the implementation of the legislation; and

•

including sunset clauses that cancel programs if they prove ineffective.
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Investment Incentives: An Introduction to the Main
Concepts and Challenges
Governments – whether acting at the supranational, national, or sub-national level – have long
used incentives (also defined as nonmarket advantages) to shape the conduct of economic actors.
The use of incentives by governments can be crucial for advancing public objectives and correcting
market failures caused by information asymmetries, externalities, and other circumstances.
Incentives can help produce positive outcomes that the market alone may not achieve by
encouraging the private sector to produce public goods, internalize and reduce negative
externalities, invest in research and development (R&D), and generate economic activity and
employment in undeveloped or marginalized areas.
Yet the use of incentives is also subject to criticism on the grounds that, while incentives might at
times attract investments and shape investor behavior, on the whole, they distort the normal
functioning of markets and result in the inefficient or suboptimal allocation of resources. For
instance, the unnecessary costs to governments’ budgets from the excessive use of tax and financial
incentives can lead to a narrowing of the tax base and the loss of public revenue necessary to
provide essential public goods and services.
Governments are apparently increasingly using investment incentives to attract and retain capital
that is more and more mobile. Governments use incentives to convince investors to forgo other
opportunities offered by competing jurisdictions in order to create employment, increase
competitiveness, generate exports, and build tax bases. Incentives are also used to encourage
already existing investments to deepen linkages with and spillovers into the host jurisdiction. In
this context, governments may offer incentives for businesses to hire local employees, procure
their goods and services from local providers, and invest in education and training.
In addition to those efforts aimed at bringing in, keeping, and benefiting from investments, more
governments are giving incentives to encourage domestic firms to grow abroad. They may provide
this support based on the assumption that outward investment can produce positive spillovers in
the home country, but whether and under what circumstances such an assumption is true are
important questions.
Investment incentives are now used pervasively across both the developed and developing world.
These incentives are often expensive, as a percentage of government revenues, a percentage of the
value of the investment being incentivized, a percentage of the country’s GDP, or the cost per job
created. In Rwanda and Sierra Leone, for instance, the governments have been reported to devote
more than one-third of tax revenues to investment incentives.11 As a percentage of GDP, estimates
11

James, Sebastian. 2013. Tax and Non-Tax Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications. 25.
http://www.estimacionestributarias.com/archivos/Effectiveness.pdf
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are that Cambodia has provided tax incentives that are 5.9% of its GDP, Ghana, 5.2%, and the
Dominican Republic, 3.9%.12 In terms of the cost of incentives per job created by an investment
project, there are examples of governments in Europe,13 the United States,14 Brazil,15 and India16
all reportedly paying more than $200,000 in incentives per position.17
In addition to these general trends in incentives, crisis events may cause dips and spikes in absolute
levels of incentives being provided, the amount of incentives relative to other government
expenditures, and the types of incentives given.18 Across many countries, the use of discretionary
incentives seems to have spiked as a result of the tumultuous events of 2020, in which the COVID19 crisis drove unprecedented peacetime shifts in public capital.19 As governments injected public
funds into efforts to support private sector activities, it is estimated that additional government

12

World Bank Group. 2018. Global Investment Competitiveness Report 2017/2018: Foreign Investor Perspectives
and Policy Implications. (Washington, DC: World Bank).
13
See, e.g., Decramer, Stefaan and Stijn Vanormelingen. (2016). “The effectiveness of investment subsidies: evidence
from
a
regression
discontinuity
design.” Small
Business
Economics, 47(4),
1007–1032.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/26154683 (estimating that a subsidy program in Flanders cost roughly EU500,000 per job
created).
14
Thomas, Kenneth P. 2011. Investment Incentives and the Global Competition for Capital. (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan) 4. Additionally, a deal between the US state of Wisconsin and Foxconn, which called for Wisconsin to
provide roughly USD 4 billion in state and local incentives, and anticipated Foxconn would provide roughly 13,000
jobs, would involve a subsidy of over USD 300,000 per job. Originally struck in 2017, the deal was subsequently
revised.
15
Id., 30.
16
Id.
17
For other studies on incentives per job created, see, e.g., Fabuš, M., and Csabay, M. (2018). “State aid and
investment:
Case
of
Slovakia.” Entrepreneurship
and
Sustainability
Issues, 6(2),
480-488.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.9770/jesi.2018.6.2(1);
18
For studies looking at the ebbs and flows in use of incentives, and the influence of economic recessions on incentives
practices, see, e.g., Hinkley, S., and Weber, R. (2021). “Incentives and Austerity: How Did the Great Recession Affect
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https://doi.org/10.1177/1078087420964254; Bartik, Timothy J. 2017. A New Panel Database on Business Incentives
for Economic Development Offered by State and Local Governments in the United States. W.E. Upjohn
Institute. http://www.upjohn.org/models/bied/maps/ReportFinal.pdf; Zheng, Lingwen, Warner, Mildred. 2010.
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Development Quarterly 24(4): 325–36. doi:10.1177/0891242410376237; Reese, Laura A., Larnell, Twyla
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(stating, on p. 116: “The drastic decrease in global FDI flows caused by the COVID-19 pandemic triggered a rise in
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spending and forgone revenue (through, e.g., tax relief) amounted to between 2% and 7% of GDP,
with the percent of GDP tending to increase with the income of the country.20
Some of the COVID-19-related incentives were designed to encourage companies to invest in
activities to directly combat the pandemic, such as investment in developing vaccines, treatments,
and personal protective equipment.21 Others were designed to help support businesses forced to
close or significantly curtail operations in light of government-imposed lockdowns and other
restrictions. Still, others aimed to generally ease burdens on investors and make doing business in
the relevant jurisdiction easier and more profitable. Near the start of the pandemic, for example,
China announced it would provide government assistance to foreign investors by simplifying
approval processes for foreign investment projects, optimizing tax exemption processes for
imports, and implementing special investor protections.22 Additionally, some measures were
designed more broadly to inject capital into the economy and, when doing so, influence investor
behavior and catalyze investment into sustainable development priorities.23
While well-designed incentives offerings can be impactful in terms of enabling countries and their
stakeholders to withstand and weather crises,24 the use of incentives in times of crisis intensifies
some of the already existing challenges and risks associated with those tools. The time-sensitive
nature of crisis response can, for example, hinder cost-benefit analysis of programs or otherwise
disrupt normal governance of incentives schemes,25 increase opportunities for corruption and
20

IMF Fiscal Monitor, October 2020. See also “Rich countries try radical economic policies to counter COVID-19,”
(26 March 2020) The Economist, available at: https://www.economist.com/briefing/2020/03/26/rich-countries-tryradical-economic-policies-to-counter-covid-19.
21
See, e.g., UNCTAD. 2021. World Investment Report 2021: Investing in Sustainable Recovery. (Geneva: UNCTAD)
(providing examples of healthcare-related investment incentives predating COVID19 as well as those adopted in
response to the pandemic on pp. 141 and 142).
22
UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor Issue 23 (April 2020); National Development and Reform Commission,
Development
and
Reform
of
Foreign
Investment
(2020)
No.
343,
https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/tz/202003/t20200311_1222902.html.
23
Vetter, David. 13 April 2020. “Use Lessons of COVID-19 to Build a Green Recovery, Say EU Ministers” Forbes,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidrvetter/2020/04/13/use-lessons-of-covid-19-to-build-a-green-recovery-say-euministers/?sh=911979a43350; Vetter, David. 16 April 2020. “South Korea Embraces EU-Style Green Deal for
COVID-19 Recovery” Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidrvetter/2020/04/16/south-korea-embraces-eustyle-green-deal-for-covid-19-recovery/?sh=537c3225611d; note also, Harvey, Fiona. 23 September 2020. “Few
countries
living
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to
Covid
“green
recovery”
pledges
–
analysis.”
The
Guardian
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/sep/23/few-countries-living-up-to-green-recovery-promisesanalysis.
24
Wen, Jean-François. (2020). Special Series on COVID-19: Temporary Investment Incentives. (IMF Fiscal Affairs),
https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/covid19-special-notes/en-special-series-on-covid-19-temporaryinvestment-incentives.ashx
25
See, e.g., Agnolucci, Irene. 2021. “Will COVID-19 Make or Break EU State Aid Control? An Analysis of
Commission Decisions Authorising Pandemic State Aid Measures.” Journal of European Competition Law and
Practice, https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpab060; Van Hove, Jan. 2020. “Impact of State Aid on Competition and
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wasteful cronyism, and strengthen beggar-thy-neighbor impulses that can create a race to the
bottom in terms of incentives use. Enhanced use of incentives during times of financial stress also
gives rise to complex issues related to macroeconomic policy and budgetary planning and
management.26
Thus, when considering the design and implementation of incentives policies, it is important to
think about how those policies operate in times of relative calm and also try to develop plans for
their operation in times of crisis. Additionally, insights derived from the use of incentives in times
of crisis can also generate insights on incentives design more generally. This report does not focus
on crisis-related incentives tools but flags it as an important subdimension that merits further
specific analysis.
The pervasive use of incentives, and examples suggesting their high cost relative to their aims or

benefits, raise two sets of key questions: The first asks whether and in what circumstances the
benefits of incentives outweigh their costs. The second question asks what regulatory regimes exist
or could be adopted to help governments ensure that their use of incentives is sufficiently
disciplined and strategic to meet policy goals. The following sections will provide an introduction
to these questions.
This is a stock-taking report rather than an analytical one. It provides a foundation for future
research in an area that remains opaque in many respects.
The report is structured as follows:
Section 1 introduces the concept of investment incentives, examining the main types of incentives
provided by governments and the economic conditions under which incentives may be used. It
also discusses particular issues that arise in connection with tax incentives for foreign direct
investment (FDI). Section 2 surveys diverse data sources to assess the scale of tax and financial
incentives used in a variety of jurisdictions. Section 3 discusses efforts by governments to track
and manage their use of incentives, focusing on cost-benefit analysis practices and efforts to
structure those incentive packages to further relevant policy aims. Section 4 focuses on governance
frameworks that limit “races to the bottom” in competition for investment.
The report concludes by identifying policy approaches that can be pursued to help improve and
rationalize the granting of incentives and ensure that, when used, they are adequately tailored to
advance long-term sustainable development.

Competitiveness during COVID-19 Pandemic: An early Assessment” requested by the Committee on Economic and
Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament (ECON Committee) and published in December 2020,
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_STU(2020)658214.
26
Hinkley, S., and Weber, R. (2021). “Incentives and Austerity: How Did the Great Recession Affect Municipal
Economic Development Policy?” Urban Affairs Review, 57(3), 820–855. https://doi.org/10.1177/1078087420964254.
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Section 1: Definitions and Types of
Incentives
Investment incentives are “targeted measures designed to influence the size, location, impact
behavior, or sector of an investment project.”27 These investment incentives could include full or
partial exemptions or deferrals of tax charges, laws, and regulations. They may be granted to any
firm operating in a particular geography or sector, or made conditional on compliance with certain
obligations or targets, such as investment or hiring plans; however, generally speaking, to be
considered an ‘incentive,’ they “must be tailored to specific investors or types of investors” for
“specific investment projects.”28 Although different sources will use slightly different definitions
or criteria for incentives for data collection, reporting and regulatory purposes, this section of the
report describes various types of measures that can be deemed incentives. Due to the wide range
of relevant measures, Sections 2 and 3 focus more narrowly on describing the use and regulation
of a subset of the larger group, namely tax and financial incentives.
1.1 Types of Investment Incentives
Investment incentives can be broken down into four types: (1) tax incentives; (2) financial
incentives; (3) regulatory incentives; and (4) technical or business support incentives.
1.1.1 Tax Incentives
Tax incentives provide reductions or exemptions from general tax laws and regulations in order to
induce an investment or an activity; tax incentives may make an investment more attractive by
increasing an investment’s rate of return or reducing associated risks and costs through the
reduction of an investment’s tax burden.29They can include:
• Exemptions: income excluded from the tax base.
• Allowances: amounts deducted from gross taxable income.
• Credits: amounts deducted from tax liability.
• Rate relief: a reduced tax rate.

27

Tavares-Lehmann, Ana Teresa, Lisa Sachs, Lise Johnson, and Perrine Toledano. 2016. Rethinking Investment
Incentives: Trends and Policy Options (New York: Columbia University) 5.
28
Id., 4.
29
Id., 24.
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• Tax deferrals: relief that takes the form of delay in paying tax (for example, accelerated
depreciation).
• Duty exemptions: duty not collected on imports that in the usual course would be collected.30
• Value-added tax (VAT) exemptions/Zero-rating: VAT collected using a lower (or zero) rate,
either on imports/production or value added.
1.1.2 Financial Incentives
Financial incentives include all financial support that is not taxed-based. Forms include the
provision of certain goods and services; transfer of funds or liabilities; transfer of funds directly or
through providing loans and guarantees; and the creation of targeted infrastructure.31 They are
divided in greater detail in Table 1.
Table 1: Financial Incentives: Instruments and Examples32
Instrument
General Financing Incentives

Financial Incentives

Provision of financing options
primarily to defray start-up costs,
but may also be offered to upgrade
or stabilize an investor’s operations

Land and Infrastructure
Incentives
Reduced rates on and/or direct
provision of land, public utilities,
or transportation granted for
specific investments

Examples
Direct Grants and
Cost-Sharing Schemes

• Cash grants on proof of start-up,
or after x years of operation
• Public sector equity participation

Lending Instruments
and Guarantees

• Soft loans
• Interest subsidies
• Loan guarantees

Reduced Market
Values or Direct
Provision of Land

• Public land or buildings sold to
investors at below market values
• Infrastructure provision such as
roads, railways, harbors, telecomm

Low Input Prices
From Parastatals

• Reduced rates on public utilities
(e.g. electricity, water) and
transportation

Training and Employment Incentives
Subsidized training programs and education commitments or
subsidies to reduce investors’ staffing costs
R&D Incentives
Grants and lending instruments to support investments in
R&D and innovation

• Job training subsidies
• Wage subsidies
• Exemptions from social security
contributions
• Subsidies supporting R&D and
Innovation

Regulatory Incentives
• Exemptions from environmental
regulationsalthough import duties are not properly
For the purpose of this report, tax incentives include duty exemptions,
Granting
exceptions
from
rules
and
regulations
defined as taxes.
31
Tavares-Lehmann,
Sachs,
Incentives, supra n26, 22.
Set-up Assistance
andJohnson,
Aftercareand Toledano, Rethinking Investment
• Preferential
32
Provided by World Bank Group Trade and Competitiveness Global Practice, Investment Policy Team.
treatment/Streamlined
Services to support investors set up and run their operations,
administrative processing
6
often provided by the domestic investment promotion agency • Administrative and consulting
assistance
• Relocation and expatriation
support
Other Non-Fiscal
Incentives

30

Only incentives that are aimed at “specific” undertakings are included in Table 1. Financial
incentives do not include measures of general applicability such as government direct financing of
public infrastructure that, although they might be crucial for attracting investment, are not targeted
toward specific investors or investments.33
1.1.3 Regulatory Incentives
Regulatory incentives offer or provide derogations from generally applicable laws or regulations.34
Those derogations may exempt companies from having to comply with otherwise applicable laws,
regulations, or permitting requirements, or may grant them special privileges and rights.35
Regulatory incentives may be bundled together, also with fiscal incentives, for instance in
‘stabilization clauses’ which exempt investors from changes to the legal framework, or as a
package of incentives for investors in special industrial zones.36
1.1.4 Technical and Business Support Incentives
Technical and business support incentives are usually provided to reduce information
asymmetries37 and administrative hassles and delays; to ease access to assets, infrastructure and
other resources necessary for business activities; and, to provide “aftercare” once an investor has
already invested.38 This particular type of incentive ensures a specific investor or type of investor
has the ability to successfully maneuver a host economy and circumvent potential costs and risks
that they may have encountered without the incentive’s support.
Some business-related measures might involve government-provided databases, reports,
publications for the investment process or seminars, webinars, or trainings on that same topic.39
Technical incentives could include government lobbying on behalf of the investor to international
33

Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were excluded from the typology here because they involve a unique mix of fiscal
and non-fiscal investment instruments.
34
The OECD defines regulatory incentives as incentives that seek to attract investments “by means of offering them
derogations from national or subnational rules and regulation.” OECD, supra n3, 17. This definition, however, may
not be adequately comprehensive since the power to provide such derogations might be conferred through national or
subnational rules and regulations, raising the question of whether or not there is in fact a “derogation”.
35
Tavares-Lehmann, Sachs, Johnson, and Toledano, Rethinking Investment Incentives, supra n26, 31.
36
Ibid., 32.
37
Investors may not always have the information they need to make use of certain activities or services. “The costs of
gathering the information or the complexity of the information may be too great, in which case improved salience of
the information or support in interpreting it could stimulate investment. Investment incentives in this case may be seen
by some governments as drawing firm owners’ attention to the range of potential services that their businesses could
use and which ones may be profitable.” Campos, Francisco, Aidan Coville, Ana M. Fernandes, Markus Goldstein,
and David McKenzie. 2012. “Learning from the Experiments That Never Happened. Lessons from Trying to Conduct
Randomized Evaluations of Matching Grant Programs in Africa.” Policy Research Working Paper 6296 (Washington,
DC: World Bank).
38
Tavares-Lehmann, Sachs, Johnson, and Toledano, Rethinking Investment Incentives, supra n26, 33.
39
Id., 34.
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organizations or provision of legal and accounting services.40 Provision of these types of incentives
is often a central plank of the work done by investment promotion agencies throughout various
stages in the lifecycle of a foreign investment in order to attract and maintain FDI, and to establish
linkages between the investment and the host jurisdiction.41
These services can be divided among the key stages of a foreign investment lifecycle, as illustrated
in Table 2 below.
Table 2: Business Support/Technical Services by Stage of Investment

Source: UNIDO (2011)42 based on surveys of African IPAs.

1.2 FDI and Incentives
Because most incentive programs do not distinguish between foreign and domestic investors in
attracting investors, this report also does not differentiate between incentives used to favor foreign
40

Ibid.
Id., 35-37.
42
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). 2012. Africa Investor Report 2011: Towards
Evidence-based Investment Promotion Strategies. (Vienna: UNIDO).
41
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or domestic capital. Therefore, it is not limited to FDI incentives per se. The costs, benefits, and
rationales for investment incentives generally do not vary based on whether the recipients are
foreign or domestic but rather on the characteristics and activities of the particular recipients
(which may correlate with nationality but are not inherent to or a necessary product of it).
Nevertheless, some attributes of FDI related to its role in the global economy that are relevant to
analysis of the use of investment incentives.
For one, FDI may often be seen as particularly valuable because it can provide access to capital
and technology unavailable in the domestic market. It is not the “foreignness” of the investment
necessarily that is attractive, but the fact that the investment possesses unique strengths that can
compensate for weaknesses or fill gaps in the host economy. This may especially be the case where
domestic entities lack the financial resources, know-how, or supportive infrastructure necessary to
meet the needs of the domestic population and be competitive in an increasingly globalized world.
FDI is a growing force in the global economy, with important policy implications for governments.
Global outward FDI stock totaled US$2 trillion in 1990; by the end of 2017, that stock was near
US$31 trillion, and at the end of 2020 it was roughly US$39 trillion.43 It is difficult to understate
the importance of the multinational enterprises that are behind this growth in FDI. As just one
indicator, roughly 80% of total world trade is intra-firm trade (i.e., trade between entities belonging
to the same corporate family or group.)44
This growth in FDI has been enabled by technological improvements that reduce transportation
costs and enhance the coordination capability of internet and telecommunications; it has also been
supported by legal, regulatory, and policy shifts at the domestic and international levels. In addition
to unilaterally liberalizing their economies, countries over the past two decades have concluded an
unprecedented number of trade and investment treaties in which countries commit to allowing
foreign individuals and entities to invest in their territories, and to permit the free flow of capital,
goods, and services across borders. While the foundational documents of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), including the 1994 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),45
involved committing to open specific sectors to foreign investors, a growing body of bilateral and
multilateral agreements increasingly obligates countries to allow foreign investment in all sectors
except those specifically excluded. Investment treaties also protect multinational firms’ abilities
to transfer capital, ensuring that, once in a particular host country, investors have significant
freedom to move capital in and out of that territory when launching, operating, and disposing of
their businesses.

43

This data on FDI stock is from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2021. World
Investment Report 2021: Investing in Sustainable Recovery (Geneva: UNCTAD).
44
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2013. World Investment Report 2013: Global
Value Chain and Investment and Trade for Development (Geneva: UNCTAD).
45
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 15 April 1994. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization. Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183.
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Such trade and investment agreements facilitate multinational enterprises’ efforts not only to
spread their activities, value chains, and cash flows across borders, but also to move those activities
as conditions in host countries and markets change. As options and mobility increase for firms, it
becomes more difficult for countries to get those investments (and the jobs, revenues, and positive
spillovers they can generate) to “stick.” Additionally, whereas competition to attract and keep
firms may formerly have been largely between different jurisdictions within one country, the
mobility of firms means that the field of competitors has been growing and now often crosses
national borders. The increasing complexity of the corporate structures of multinational enterprises
– the relationships between parent firms and their subsidiaries and affiliates, branches, and holding
companies – means that incentives provided in one location can often be effectively enjoyed by a
firm operating in a different location. Transfer pricing, which can be exceedingly difficult to
regulate, can be used to allow firms with a presence in a low-tax jurisdiction, or where substantial
tax incentives are offered, to shift revenues or profits to that jurisdiction to avoid paying taxes in
a more highly taxed location. In addition to affecting the attractiveness of a particular incentive for
the firm, this can also affect its fiscal cost, not only for the jurisdiction granting the advantage, but
also for other locations where the firm’s affiliates are sited (see Box 8).
In addition to those issues of transfer pricing, which can influence the calculation and distribution
of benefits associated with a given tax incentive, the distribution of international production
through global value chains can also impact whether and to what extent FDI will produce outcomes
anticipated by the host country. While patterns can differ based on the firm, its place in the
corporate family, and relevant industry and sector, FDI by a multinational enterprise may utilize
fewer domestic inputs than a domestic counterpart, and may also repatriate, rather than reinvest, a
greater share of its revenues. For instance, while efficiency-seeking FDI in services and
manufacturing might be motivated to invest in maintaining and upgrading facilities and operations
in the host country, revenues from FDI in extractive industries may be more likely to be repatriated
after upfront capital expenditures have been made. These features and patterns will shape the
nature and degree of firms’ impacts on host countries, and the desirability of incentivizing those
firms’ investments.
FDI can provide important benefits for host and home countries (see Box 1), but it also poses
challenges that can be hard to predict, identify, and manage. These issues, in turn, make it difficult
for governments to identify whether, to what extent, in what circumstances, and how to incentivize
such investment. Moreover, while FDI increases the complexity of calculations for the incentive
granter, it provides advantages to firms shopping for incentives when deciding where to locate.
Those firms can exploit the fact that a given enterprise frequently has a range of potential locations
available to it, while information asymmetries regarding firms’ locational decisions lead wouldbe hosts to compete for their business.46
46

Jensen, Nathan M. 2018. “Bargaining and the Effectiveness of Economic Development Incentives: an Evaluation
of the Texas Chapter 313 Program.” 29-51. Public Choice.
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1.3 FDI and Motives
Firms invest abroad for four main categories of reasons:47
•

Market-seeking FDI: firms search for new consumers of their goods or services;

•

Natural resource-seeking FDI: firms pursue access to natural resources and raw
materials;

•

Efficiency-seeking FDI: firms seek to decrease costs of production by transferring
production to locations with lower labor, environmental, or other costs or otherwise
rationalizing their operations across borders;

•

Strategic-asset-seeking FDI: firms pursue tangible or intangible assets (e.g., advanced
technology owned by the target company) in order to strengthen their positioning visà-vis competitors.

Factors that influence where firms undertake this FDI include host states’ (a) general economic
policy framework for FDI, (b) economic determinants and conditions, and (c) business
facilitation environment. Table 3 illustrates how these determinants – firm motives and host
country characteristics – interact to influence where FDI occurs.48
Table 3: Locational Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment49
Economic policy framework for FDI 50
Economic, political, and social stability
Rules regarding entry and operations
Standards of treatment of foreign operations
Policies on the functioning and structure of markets (especially competition, Mergers and Acquisition
[M&A]; and corporate governance)
Privatization policy
Trade policy (tariffs and non-tariff barriers) and coherence of FDI and trade policies
Tax policy
47

Dunning, John H. and Sarianna M. Lundan. 2008. Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy. 63-78.
https://dipiufabc.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/dunning_multinational-enterprises-and-global-economy.pdf
48
UNCTAD. 1998. World Investment Report 1998: Trends and Determinants. (Geneva: UNCTAD); UNCTAD. 2000.
World Investment Report 2000: Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions and Development. (Geneva: UNCTAD).
49
Based on UNCTAD. 1998. World Investment Report 1998: Trends and Determinants. (Geneva: UNCTAD);
UNCTAD World Investment Reports 2010: Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy. (Geneva: UNCTAD); Krüger, Ralf
and Strauss, Ilan. “Africa Rising out of Itself: The Growth of Intra-African FDI.” Columbia Center on Sustainable
Investment 139; Dunning John H, and Lundan, Sarianna M. 2008. supra n47; Oxelheim, Lars and Pervez N. Ghauri
eds. 2004. European Union and the Race for Foreign Direct Investment in Europe. International Business and
Management Series. (Elsevier).
50
Different types of FDI will put different weight on those various factors.
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Good governance
Protection of property rights (including intellectual property)
Industrial and regional policies; development of competitive clusters
Stable exchange rates

Economic determinants by multinational enterprise (MNE) motive
Market-seeking
motive

Natural resourceseeking motive*
Efficiency-seeking
motive

Strategic assetseeking motive*

Market size and per capita income
Market growth
Access to regional and global markets
Country-specific consumer preferences
Structure of markets
Physical distance
Land and building costs: rents and rates
Access to raw materials, components, parts
Access to natural resources
Cost of resources and assets listed under resource- or asset-seeking motives
Availability and cost of unskilled and skilled labor
Other input costs, including costs of other intermediate products and transportation
and communication costs
Membership in a regional integration agreement conducive to the establishment of
regional corporate networks
Different comparative advantages of countries
Better deployment of global resources
Access to new competitive advantages, e.g., coming from firm-specific technological
and other created assets (e.g. brand names)
Access to technology, know-how, and marketing networks
Country-specific assets (e.g., in the case of tourism, cultural heritage).

Business facilitation
Investment promotion (image-building, actions to reduce information asymmetries)
Investment incentives (tax, financial, regulatory, and other)
Technical services, including:
Reduction of hassle costs (related to corruption, administrative efficiency)
Provision of social amenities (bilingual schools, quality of life)
Provision of after-investment services
Availability of “one-stop shop” services to centralize procedures and information
Note: UNCTAD (1998) has the two categories of natural resource-seeking and strategic asset-seeking motives grouped
together as “Resource/asset-seeking” motives.

The effectiveness of tax incentives on investors’ investment location decisions varies based on the
nature of the business and its motive for FDI (Table 4).
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Table 4: Typology of FDI and Response to Tax Incentives51
Type
Investment

of Factors that drive investment

Response
incentives

to

investment

tax

Resource-seeking
FDI

Location of natural resources/raw Lower response. FDI driven primarily by
materials/low-skilled labor/agglomeration non-tax factors.
benefits

Market-seeking
FDI

Market potential
Lower response. Same tax system for all
- Market dimensions
competitors (a level playing field) is
- Income per capita
critical. However, higher response at the
- Customer-specific preferences
regional level (such as within the EU or
- Kind of goods and services to be within the U.S.).
provided
- Competitors
Lower costs
Higher response to tax incentives. Firms
- Mostly export oriented
are expected to compete globally, hence
- Availability of skills at low costs
the lower the costs, the better their ability
- Close to markets
to compete globally.
- Low relocation costs
Acquiring strategic assets
Lower response. FDI is driven by the
- Brands and market positioning
location of the asset. However, lower
- Know-how
taxes on capital gains reduces the costs of
- Technology
the transfer of these assets.
- Distribution networks
- Human capital

Efficiency-seeking
FDI

Strategic-assetseeking FDI

Reproduced from James, 2013
This typology provides a starting point for the analysis of incentives. For example, as Table 4
shows, firms engaging in FDI to enter new markets or acquire natural resources (or other resources
or strategic assets) appear less motivated by tax incentives than highly mobile and efficiencyseeking firms that seek to reduce costs for products destined for a global, rather than domestic,
market. Industries, as well as firms within industries, can vary in their sensitivity to cost differences
across locations, so this table provides a starting analytical framework for understanding when
incentives are more or less effective in attracting investment.
It is also worth noting that, though incentives may have less effect on the location of marketseeking investments than they would on efficiency-seeking investments, they may nevertheless
51

Adapted from James, supra n11.
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have some influence on market-seeking investment decisions in cases where firms are deciding
among similarly attractive locations or among similarly attractive regions of a single large market
(such as the United States, European Union, or China). Further research could further nuance in
this analysis by investigating how firms make investment decisions in the industrial sector.
Lastly, Box 1 presents investment incentives in the particular context of efforts to support outward
FDI.

Box 1: Outward FDI Incentives
Most attention given to FDI incentives has been focused on incentives for inward FDI, i.e. what
support measures can be put in place to attract FDI, based on a broad consensus that the impacts
of such investment and the flow of resources it brings to host countries tend to be positive. Until
recently, less attention was paid to the impacts of outward FDI (OFDI), and some governments
even applied measures to restrict or dissuade OFDI.52 Arguments against exporting jobs and
technology have quashed many measures to promote OFDI. However, governments have begun
to adopt home country measures to stimulate outward investments, as at least some research
substantiates the link between OFDI and other policy aims such as strong exports and economic
growth, opportunities for job creation, and increasing innovation and technological development
in the home country. Governments may also promote OFDI for other strategic and policy aims,
such as to support sustainable development outcomes in host countries.
Thus, an increasing number of governments have become proactive in helping domestic
companies scale up operations and reach new markets in order to compete in or serve the global
arena. Indeed, many emerging economies have adopted strong support measures and spurred an
exponential increase in OFDI, leading to some controversy and to concerns about competitive
neutrality.53
What types of OFDI incentives exist? How do they differ from those on the inward side?
There are different typologies to categorize OFDI incentives/policies. The OECD has identified54
three types: financial, regulatory and tax. Economou & Sauvant provide an alternative
classification: (i) institutional framework; (ii) information services; (iii) financial measures; (iv)
52

Sauvant, Karl P. 2008. “Outward FDI from Emerging Markets: Some Policy Issues.” In John H. Dunning and
Philippe Gugler eds. Foreign Direct Investment, Location and Competitiveness, Progress in International Business
Research Vol. 2. 279-284.
53
Sauvant Karl P., Persephone Economou, Ksenia Gal, Shawn Lim, and Witold P. Wilinski. 2014. “Trends in FDI,
Home Country Measures and Competitive Neutrality.” In Andrea K. Bjorklund ed. Yearbook On International
Investment Law and Policy 2012–2013. (New York: Oxford University Press) 3-108.
54
OECD supra n3.
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fiscal measures; (v) investment insurance measures; (vi) treaties.55 Here, we propose the following
five categories:
Outward FDI Home Country Measures
Tax

Tax breaks/exemptions, rate reductions, tax deductions, loss
carryforwards, deferrals, accelerated depreciation, customs
benefits.56

Financial

Monetary transfers – cash or subsidies. Grants, loans (preferential
access to credit and/or low interest) and even equity participation
on investment projects.57

Risk-minimizing
measures

Political risk insurance (PRI) and credit risk insurance. PRI protects
against political upheavals, losses due to certain events such as
expropriation/nationalization, war, and other conflicts, and
restrictions on the repatriation of capital. Credit risk insurance
relates to the failure of clients to honor their payments.

Regulatory
and Regulatory measures – measures including investment agreements,
investment climate double taxation treaties – shaping the legal and economic
measures
investment climate in potential host countries.

Information
and Information on markets and operations (economic data, information
technical services
on industry and on other stakeholders – competitors, suppliers,
clients, partners, entities from the scientific/technological system,
global value chains, costs, skills, availability of distinct resources,
identification of opportunities, other business intelligence; services
such as feasibility research, legal support, skill training programs,
consulting activities, international exchange programs for human
resources, support to trade fairs and missions, etc.)
Probably the most critical difference vis-à-vis inward FDI policy is that home countries have less
control over the host environment and associated stakeholders and locational attributes. Thus, the
home country is more constrained (or even powerless) in the ability to change some of these
55
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factors. At home, they are naturally better able to influence relevant FDI-related determinants. For
example, the home country’s government cannot change several relevant aspects pertaining to the
investment decision and its profitability/performance (labor laws, the bureaucratic circuit to be
followed, the granting of favorable or exceptional positive discrimination measures, etc.). While
very influential home countries may be able to influence policy adoption in weaker host countries,
they still are markedly less influential than within their own borders.
Another key difference is likely that monitoring of outcomes in third states may be especially
difficult, and positive indicators in those host states may not align with the indicators of success
being used in the home country. All this, together with the comparative lack of experience in the
design and implementation of OFDI incentives, renders the task of conceiving and putting into
practice OFDI policies more complex than what concerns their inward-focused counterparts.

1.4 Do Incentives Matter for Investment Location Decisions in General?
Several studies indicate that the role of incentives in influencing investment location decisions by
both domestic and foreign investors is often limited in developing and emerging countries (Table
5) across sectors and motivations. This may be because tax incentives are often unable to
compensate for unattractive investment environments marked by poor infrastructure, legal and
economic instability, weak governance, and small markets.58 Morisset and Pirnia thusly argue that
“incentives will generally neither make up for serious deficiencies in the investment environment
nor generate the desired externalities.”59
In Table 5 we summarize various studies looking at the effectiveness of incentives in terms of
shaping investment location decisions. For example, World Bank Investment Climate surveys
consistently find that investors do not consider incentives to have been pivotal for their investment
decisions. Other studies survey investors on the factors that are most important for their investment
decisions. These surveys reveal that incentives are a minor factor in firms’ investment decisions.
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Table 5: Tax Incentives and Locational Decisions-Survey
Author

Focus of survey

Investment Climate Burundi (2011)
Advisory investor
Guinea (2012)
motivation
60
surveys
Jordan (2009)
Kenya (2012)
Nicaragua (2009)

FIAS61

Conclusion

Redundancy
ratio
for
incentives
(would have
invested even
if incentives
were
not
provided)

Did incentives
influence
Investment
level? (share
saying yes)
77%

30%

92%

6%

70%

28%

61%

11%

15% (51% for 17%
non-exporting
firms outside
free zones)

Rwanda (2011)

98%

21%

Tanzania (2011)

91%

8%

Tunisia (2012)

58%

25%

Uganda (2011)

93%

13%

Thailand (1999)

81%

-

60
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Nathan Associates62 Mozambique (2009)

78%63

UNIDO64

Covering 2000-2011,
7000 firms in 19
countries in subSaharan Africa65

Bartik66

Meta-analysis of 30 Redundancy rates between
published studies in 75% to 98%, with higher rates
the US
for less biased studies.

13%

Incentives ranked 11th out of
12 location factors; incentives
also noted as a “deteriorating”
factor over the previous 3 years

This summary of studies combines analysis of different types of programs across countries and
illustrates a general pattern of locational incentives’ inefficacy.
To glean more comparable insights on the efficacy of these programs, analysts could examine a
single country’s incentive programs for how they influence firm behavior. Some of the most
sophisticated work on incentives explores various national, state, and local incentives in the United
States. For instance, in a meta-analysis of 30 published studies of incentives, Bartik finds “but for”
percentages of 2% and 25%.67 In other words, incentives were only responsible for swinging
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between 2% and 25% of investments, and were ineffective between 75% and 98% of the time. As
noted by Bartik

, the variation in these estimates is the result of research methodology – many studies seem to be
biased towards finding that incentives have a positive effect on firm decisions. For example, firms
that apply for expansion incentives are most likely different from firms that are not applying for
incentives. Studies that compare incentive applicants relative to non-applicants as a control group
are biased towards finding incentives are effective in encouraging expansion decisions.
Other research on the effectiveness has been conducted in the European Union where the State
Aid regime68 has improved transparency and analysis of government incentives. One study
published in 2020 examined the role of EU Member States’ investment incentives in shaping
investors’ location decisions. Based on literature reviews, econometric analysis, surveys, and
interviews, the study concluded that:
•

•

•
•

The existence of investment incentives will not likely cause an investor to locate its
investment in a particular location; but it may be a factor that helps companies choose
between a shortlist of relatively similarly situated jurisdictions.
The absence of incentives in one jurisdiction, when other jurisdictions offer incentives,
may cause an investor to reject the jurisdiction without the incentives. In other words, while
an incentive may not bring an investment, the lack of an incentive may result in a
jurisdiction not attracting investment.
Investors from some home countries seem to put more weight on the offer of incentives
than others.
“The literature on the impacts of regional aid on the EU’s ability to direct investments to
disadvantaged regions of the EU is reviewed in the fourth subsection. The empirical
evidence suggests that aid has an impact on the decision making of small and sometimes
even medium-sized firms, but there is little evidence that aid would affect the incentives of
large firms.”69

The redundancy of incentives may be due to their design. For example, Jensen (2018) examines a
Texas incentive program that structurally leads to the overuse of incentives.70 This program allows
local school districts to provide tax abatements to firms, but the school districts pass the costs of
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these abatements to the state. These school districts not only receive the tax revenue for these
investments (from the state), but they can also require additional “supplemental payments” from
firms. School districts generate more tax revenues by offering abatements through these programs
(by being compensated by the state along with supplemental payments) leading to the overuse of
incentives. Jensen (2018) found that 85% of these firms would have been located in Texas even
without this incentive program.
Another issue is that even if an incentive succeeds in attracting investment, the investment attracted
may not be ideal. For example, some research on regulatory incentives found that while
jurisdictions with low environmental standards might have been able to use those low standards to
attract efficiency-seeking firms, the firms primarily responding to those environmental incentives
were not the most competitive.71
While such studies are surely not conclusive, their results raise serious questions about the
efficiency and efficacy of many investment incentives to attract or keep the investment. Given the
scarcity of public capital for investments in development-driving public goods, this data points to
a need to more carefully design and monitor the impact of investment incentives.
1.5 Behavioral Incentives
Much of this report focuses on locational incentives: incentives provided to entice investors to
come to, or stay or expand in, a particular jurisdiction. However, there are also behavioral
incentives (which can be combined with locational incentives) that seek to encourage investors to
modify their operations, such as by investing in R&D on different problems or at a greater scale
than they otherwise would have without the incentives,72 or shifting to cleaner, more
environmentally sound modes of production than they would employ absent the incentives.73
When considering the use, effectiveness, costs and benefits of incentives, it is useful to distinguish
between behavioral incentives and locational incentives. Studies on the effectiveness of investment
incentives, for instance, often ask investors whether they would have invested in a particular
location absent the incentive, or about the importance of investment incentives influencing
investors’ decisions to invest in a specific host country relative to other characteristics of the host
country (e.g., the quality of infrastructure, the general business climate). These studies, as noted
above, often raise questions about the efficacy of locational incentives. Research on behavioral
incentives, in contrast, will have different targets and ask different questions, and produce different
71
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insights and lessons for policymakers. Analysis of behavioral incentives has, at least in some
contexts, been more positive.74
Throughout this report, we seek to distinguish between research and insights on locational
incentives, and research and insights on behavioral incentives. Overall, it seems that while many
of the best practices regarding the use of incentives apply to both categories, locational incentives
give rise to more concerns about races to the bottom and harmful competitions for capital.
1.6 Conditions Under Which Investment Incentives Make Economic Sense
There are conditions under which the provision of investment incentives can be strategic.
Examples of factors or situations providing an economic rationale for the use of investment
incentives include providing incentives 1) for the provision of public goods; 2) to generate positive
externalities; 3) to address credit market failures; and 4) to overcome private firms’ risk aversion.
These are discussed below. Most often, the situations in which governments may use investment
incentives is a combination of more than one of those factors or situations. Yet, as Sebastian James
notes, recognizing that there are economic rationales supporting the use of incentives does not
mean “that incentives should be offered to correct all such market failures or anomalies.”75 It rather
means “that there are areas where governments may consider applying further analysis to see if
intervention through incentives is warranted.” 76
1.6.1 Public Goods
When faced with the challenge of defining a policy to stimulate certain economic activities or
sectors, or to attract investment, a government should always decide which policy approach is
more likely to generate the most beneficial effect on the citizens’ welfare. For example, there is a
trade-off between spending directly on public goods and services, and spending it to provide
investment incentives that can indirectly generate public goods. The marginal benefit from an
additional investment in a public good is usually more than its marginal cost, especially when the
supply of such public good is low. Hence, it would be beneficial to invest more in public goods.
At the same time, an investment incentive can attract private investment that is beneficial to the
economy. Thus, when comparing spending options, a government should consider the opportunity
costs of public funds. 77
For example, if a government invests in the improvement or upscaling of roads,
telecommunications, or education in areas where these were previously weak, that investment will
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likely be more effective in attracting new investment, compared to granting the same amount of
money in tax incentives to, say, a mining company in that area.78
Another issue is that the market will never supply certain public goods, or if it does, it will do so
insufficiently. In such cases, one should consider whether investment incentives can efficiently
address the undersupply.79
1.6.2 Positive Externalities
Economic activity often leads to spillover effects or positive externalities on the economy, social
welfare, and environmental protection that governments want to encourage, possibly through the
use of incentives aimed at fostering sustainable development. Positive externalities could be the
result of:
•

“investments in technology such as research and development or high-tech industries that
improve workers’ productivity;

•

improvements in overall access to electricity that encourage business growth;

•

job creation in areas of high unemployment;

•

adoption of environmentally friendly technology; and

•

anchor investments, meaning those that provide multiplier effects through signaling and by
creating backward linkages into the local economy.”80

For example, a 2018 report by Austin, Glaeser and Summers argues that some place-based policies
can be economically efficient if targeted at high-unemployment areas.81 They find that externalities
associated with non-employment in certain areas can justify government intervention to create
jobs. Thus, the size of the positive externalities associated with employment creation is,
unsurprisingly, context-dependent, with higher returns in areas with higher unemployment.
1.6.3 Credit Market Failure
Governments may use financial incentives in situations where firms might be credit‐constrained
and therefore unable to undertake investments even if promisingly profitable. The best solution in
this case would be to address inefficiencies in the credit market. Yet developing inclusive financial
systems takes time and can be expensive;—and ultimately, decisions about who receives loans
78
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will be determined by financial institutions and not the government. While the main emphasis
should remain on improving the availability and quality of term finance as part of developing
financial systems, it might also be strategic for some governments to provide financial incentives,
such as matching grants or subsidized loans.
First, they can partially fix the credit market failure by directly providing credit for activities that
banks would not traditionally finance. Banks tend to finance activities that can be collateralized,
such as the purchase of equipment. However, “they are less likely to finance consulting, training,
or high‐risk intangible activities such as those associated with start-ups and innovation, for which
matching grants are often used.”82 Second, matching grants can provide a signal of the good quality
of the investment, which reduces the risks for banks to provide credit and increases the likelihood
of future successful loan applications.83
1.6.4 Private Firm Risk Aversion
Governments may also use financial incentives to entice risk-averse firms. These firms might
avoid investing even with an expectation of high returns if high, uninsurable risk is involved. In
this case, an equity market or a venture capital market would be optimal, enabling firms to share
risks with investors. However, in the absence of an equity or venture capital market, financial
incentives such as matching grants, equity participation, and subsidized loans can increase the
expected return on the investment by lowering its price, which encourages firms to take on riskier
projects.84
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Section 2: Global Trends in Investment
Incentives
To evaluate incentives and the policies governing them, it is important to gather information on
their use. Several older studies have sought to answer this question, compiling data on incentives
granted by various countries worldwide over the past several decades. These include research from
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in the 1990s covering the
types and use of incentives in more than 100 countries; 85 a study published by the Development
Centre of the OECD;86 research on investment incentives in Africa by the United Nations
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO);87 data on aid in the European Union by the
European Competition Commission; and other information collected by academics,88 the media,89
and nongovernmental organizations.90
This section uses these sources to broadly illustrate patterns and practices regarding the use of tax
and financial incentives over time and in different regions around the globe. We include some
studies examining the use of incentives as far back as the 1990s. We include them due to the fact
that they have looked at the policy tools covered by this report and in order to provide context.
Nevertheless, we also note that the landscape of international economic activities has changed
dramatically in recent decades. The rise of bilateral and plurilateral trade and investment
agreements has liberalized the flow of goods, services, and capital across borders; those policy
shifts, combined with technological changes, have resulted in the rise and expansion of global
value chains. The mobility of forms and segmented nature of production likely have implications
for the use of incentives and would not be fully addressed in early studies on the global use of
incentives.
Another caveat when reviewing studies is that there are significant limitations in terms of what is
known about incentives practice, which results from the discretionary and frequently opaque
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nature through which many incentives are granted, and limited requirements to report on incentives
granted or outcomes achieved.91
The figures from the EU stand out in that they provide a relatively comprehensive set of
information regarding the use of incentives. This is due to requirements for member states to report
subsidies and the EU’s public disclosure of reported information. While EU data does not capture
all incentives offered by its member states or incentives granted by the EU’s institutions, its
reporting requirements, their enforcement, and the public release of the information provide a
degree of transparency that is unique as compared to many other regions of the world. Apart from
the EU and efforts by some subnational entities, information regarding the use of incentives (e.g.,
what is being provided, who is granting incentives, for what type of investment to what investor,
and at what aid intensity) has not been systematically collected or disclosed, hindering research
and analysis of policy issues and solutions.
2.1 An Overview of Global Practices
Two 2018 reports, one by the World Bank presenting findings on tax incentives offered by 107
developing countries from 2009 through 201592 and another by UNCTAD offering insights from
a survey of WTO Trade Policy Reviews, provide an overview of the use of tax and, albeit to a
lesser extent, other types of incentives offered by countries across the globe. Key findings on those
incentives included:
•

At least 75% of developing countries use tax incentives.93

•

Financial incentives appear to be used less frequently than tax incentives in developing
countries but seem to play a greater role in developed countries.94
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•

The trend seems to be toward increasing in frequency and generosity of incentives. While
“[almost half of all countries introduced new tax incentives or increased existing ones …
in the five-year period to 2016,” “[f]ewer than a quarter abolished tax incentives or made
them less generous.”95

•

Roughly 40% of developing countries offer tax incentives indiscriminately to all or most
economic sectors. This means that incentives may be offered to investors in sectors and
activities that are typically not influenced (or influenced primarily) by tax incentives, such
as natural-resource-seeking investors and market-seeking investors.96

•

Profit-based incentives such as tax holidays and preferential tax rates appear more common
than cost-based incentives, notwithstanding general consensus about cost-based incentives
being the better policy tool, due to the administrative challenges. (See Section 3)

•

Among developing countries, tax holidays are the most commonly used tax incentive,
followed by preferential tax rates. When tax holidays are granted, the median duration is
10 years.97

•

UNCTAD’s survey of recent WTO Trade Policy Reviews found that roughly 80% of
manufacturing incentives schemes were tied to compliance with performance requirements
such as requirements for minimum capital investments, to invest in a particular location, to
contribute to R&D, or to create a certain number of jobs.

In sectors that are largely efficiency-seeking, competition to attract FDI is high, leading to greater
use of incentives.98 Sectors seeking access to natural resources and domestic markets are less
influenced by incentives. Yet many developing countries offer incentives to all sectors. Across the
board, incentives do not compensate for less favorable investment climates overall.
Furthermore, those tax incentives were more effective when used to attract efficiency-seeking FDI,
because these are the most motivated to lower production costs.99 The World Bank report identifies
a global trend towards lower taxation of “geographically mobile capital” as governments compete
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to attract FDI.100 As countries continue to lower taxes in response to a competitor’s move to attract
investment, the intended effect of incentives is greatly diminished.
2.2 Policy Objectives and Implementation Approaches
The 2018 UNCTAD study,101 which dealt solely with developing countries, also supports what
previous studies have revealed, which is that there are a number of different motives behind
countries’ use of incentives, including strategies that are regionally oriented; focused on
developing prioritized areas or activities; or applied to support certain industries.
In middle- and high-income countries, there is an emphasis on promoting strategic sectors and
high-growth activities. With some exceptions, eligibility criteria in those countries for incentives
rarely discriminate between foreign and national investors. That said, in practice, foreign
enterprises may be better positioned to acquire certain incentives because they can be more flexible
in location choice and more apt to conduct R&D, or to invest in strategic sectors. The main types
of policy objectives relate to:
•

job creation/retention;

•

promotion of strategic or priority sectors;

•

development of human resources;

•

supporting R&D and the transfer of technology;

•

encouraging investment in less developed areas within a country; and

•

supporting the growth of SMEs.

The incentives awarded to industries of high added-value production tend to be more substantial
than those awarded to other industries. Some countries (e.g. Rwanda and Uganda) have very
targeted incentives, such as those that focus exclusively on technology R&D or the growth of
SMEs.102 Low-income countries, on the other hand, appear more likely to adopt “specific”
incentive approaches tailored to individual investors or projects. They are more likely to offer
incentives on a case-by-case basis.
Countries that are loosely acknowledged to have achieved success with their investment schemes
in the investment policy literature mentioned above (e.g., Austria and Czech Republic) tend to
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focus on projects that prioritize (i) staff training (human resources), (ii) the diffusion of technology,
and (iii) the development of lesser developed regions.
2.3 Investment Incentives in the European Union: State Aids103
In the EU, some incentives are considered “State Aid,” which is defined under EU law as: (1) aid,
in any form whatsoever, (2) which confers an advantage or benefit for the recipient; (3) granted
by a member state or through state resources; (4) distorts or threatens to distort competition by
favoring certain undertakings;104 or the production of certain goods; and (5) affects or is likely to
affect trade between member states. All five elements must be met for government assistance to
count as State Aid (see also Box 2 below and Section 4). Those that do constitute State Aid are
prohibited unless they are used for certain policy objectives and satisfy other tests, such as whether
they are proportionate to their goals.
Although not all investment incentives fall within this definition, many do. Data compiled by the
European Competition Commission on State Aid thus helps illustrate the use of incentives in EU
Member States.
Box 2: Key Concepts and Definitions in EU Regulation of State Aid105
Aid intensity: Aid intensity is a measurement of aid that looks at the amount of aid as a percentage
of the total investment. EU rules require the calculation of aid intensity in terms of “gross grant
equivalents,” or the discounted value of the aid expressed as a percentage of the discounted value
of specified eligible investment costs. Under EU regulations, the permissible level of aid intensity
varies based on the economic conditions in the jurisdiction granting the incentive. The more
disadvantaged states and regions are able to provide incentives at a higher degree of aid intensity
than the less disadvantaged states. If an incentive is being used to support a small to medium-sized
enterprise, the permissible aid intensity will rise; but if the incentive is used to support a “large
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applies the undertaking test very narrowly. It does not take into account whether a fee is charged or whether the amount
of profit is appropriate. Neither does it consider whether the organization has charitable aims or other social objects.
Public sector organizations that have engaged in an economic activity have been found to be undertakings. (Italy v
Commission, 1991 ECR I-1433).
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investment project” the permissible aid intensity will drop. The European Commission develops
specific guidelines to determine allowed aid intensities.
Form of aid: States provide aid in many different forms. Aid may, for example, take the form of
grants; low-interest loans or interest rebates; state guarantees; the purchase of a share-holding or
an alternative provision of capital on favorable terms; exemptions or reductions in taxes; social
security or other compulsory charges; or the supply of land, goods or services at favorable prices.
Horizontal aid: Horizontal aid is used to pursue objectives of common interest in accordance with
Article 107(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union (TFEU). EU rules may permit
horizontal aid even though it does not meet the definition of State Aid. It includes aid for the
pursuit of environmental goals; research, development and innovation; employment and training;
and support of small- and medium-sized enterprises. States granting such aid can use different
tools, such as reporting requirements and claw-back provisions, to ensure that aid is used to support
the intended policy objective.
Noncrisis State Aid: Noncrisis State Aid excludes measures aimed at supporting the financial
sector, aiding recapitalization and providing impaired asset relief in relation to the financial crisis.
Following EU methodology adopted in order to avoid distorting the picture of trends, the
discussion in this report excludes crisis aid unless otherwise stated. The EU’s methodology for
calculating non-crisis State Aid also excludes subsidies to the railway sector and aid for services
of general economic interest.
Investment aid v. operating aid: Investment aid is “aid awarded for investment in material and
immaterial assets relating to the setting up of a new establishment, the extension of an existing
establishment, diversification of the output of an establishment into new, additional products, or a
fundamental change in the overall production process of an existing establishment.” Operating aid
is regional aid used to reduce a firm’s current expenses (e.g., tax exemptions or reductions in social
security contributions). Because operating aid is not considered to be tied to new investment, job
creation, or general development, it is only rarely permitted.
Regional aid: This category of State Aid is granted to promote the economic development of
certain disadvantaged regions within the European Union. It consists of (1) investment aid granted
to large companies in designated areas or, in specific limited circumstances, operating aid; and (2)
investment aid to small- and medium-sized enterprises within disadvantaged regions that exceeds
what is allowed in other areas. Because of its policy purpose, this type of State Aid may be allowed,
subject to certain criteria. The amount of aid permitted depends on the degree to which the region
is disadvantaged relative to other areas of the EU, or relative to the national average. Regional aid
maps are used to determine the regions that are eligible for regional investment aid and the
maximum aid intensities for those regions.
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Data reported by EU member states indicates that the use of State Aid has generally decreased
significantly since the 1980s, likely due to the implementation and enforcement of regulations on
such aid (those regulations are described further in Section 4). Yet, since 2014, when the EU
reformed its State Aid scheme, State Aid has been on the rise again in absolute terms and,
generally, as a percent of GDP.106 (See Figure 1). In 2019, State Aid amounted to roughly 0.81%
of GDP across EU Member States.107 Spending per country, and within each country over time,
varies significantly. Figure 1 below shows absolute levels of spending in EU member states from
2000 to 2019, while Figure 2 shows spending as a percentage of each member state’s GDP from
2009 to 2019.
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To help the economy in the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak, the European Commission adopted the Temporary
Framework for COVID-19 State aid ("Temporary Framework”) in March 2020, which allows EU Member States to
have State aid approved quickly by the Commission. It has been amended six times since then: First, expanding public
funding opportunities for research, testing, and production of COVID-19-fighting products. Second, to enable
recapitalization and subordinated debt measures; and third, to provide additional support for micro, small, and startup businesses, as well as to encourage private investment. A fourth amendment extended the Temporary Framework's
coverage once more and extended its application until 2021. The Fifth Amendment extended the Temporary
Framework's application until the end of 2021, increased the amount of aid that the Commission could approve, and
allowed the conversion of a limited amount of repayable Temporary Framework aid to grants. Lastly, the 6th
Amendment prolonged the Temporary Framework until 30 June 2022 and has added investment and solvency support
measures to aid economic recovery and raise certain aid ceilings. To accurately show historic trend, this study only
examines the notion of “default” State Aid mechanism for the period preceding global Covid pandemic. Thus,
potential effects of the EU’s Covid recovery actions, or the Ukraine-Russia war were not addressed.
107
Although this is low relative to the 1980s, when State Aid was roughly 2% of GDP, the amount of State Aid has
roughly doubled since 2010. European Union Commission
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Figure 1: State Aid Expenditure from 2000-2019, Excluding Aid to Agriculture, Fisheries,
and Railways, by Member State, in EUR billion

Among EU Member States, Germany has tended to grant the most. In 2019, it provided EUR 53
billion, or roughly 39% of total EU State Aid.108
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European Commission. 2021. State Aid Scoreboard 2020, p. 15.
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Figure 2: State Aid in the EU28 as a Percentage of GDP, 2009-2019109
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Figure 3: Total State Aid Expenditure by Country, Excluding Aid to Agriculture, Fisheries,
and Railways (as a Percent of GDP, 2019)110
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Data is from the EU State Aid Scoreboards.
European Commission 2021, supra n.108, 14.
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Within the overall downward trend, EU rules have also produced a shift toward the use of
horizontal aid (see Box 2.)111 In some states, the share of horizontal aid is lower, but in only a few
does it fall below 50%.112 This shift toward horizontal aid reflects a greater use of incentives to
address market failures and to pursue specific, previously identified goals important to the EU as
opposed to more generally encouraging new or supporting existing investment in a given sector or
industry.
Figure 4: Share of Total State Aid Spending, Excluding Agricultural Aid, for Horizontal and
Non-Horizontal Objectives113

111

As indicated in the text, these numbers do not include crisis aid, nor aid to agriculture, fisheries, or transport.
European Commission 2021, supra n.108, 8.
113
Id., 33.
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Figure 5: Non-Crisis State Aid for Horizontal Objectives as Percentage of Total Aid (19922017)114

In terms of aims advanced by EU State Aid, environmental protection (including energy savings
and promoting the use of renewable energy) has been the policy objective supported by the greatest
share of State Aid over recent years.
Figure 6 shows spending on environmental aims, as compared to spending on other aims, from
2009-2019. Aid for regional development, and aid for research, development, and innovation
(RDI) have tended to be policy objectives receiving the second and third most State Aid, swapping
places or being in close races from year to year.115 Figure 7 shows State Aid expenditures across
EU Member States in 2019 per policy objective.116
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Id., Directorate-General for Competition; European Commission Competition Scoreboard 2017; European
Commission Competition Scoreboard 2018.
115
Compare the Scoreboard for 2019 data (RDI represented 10%, and regional development 8.5%), with the
Scoreboard for 2018 data (RDI and regional development aid were each roughly 9%), and 2017 data.
116
State Aid Scoreboard 2020 (showing data for 2019).
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Figure 6: Total State Aid Expenditure, Excluding Aid to Agriculture, Fisheries, and
Railways, as a % of EU28 GDP117

Figure 7: EU State Aid by Policy Objective, 2019118
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Most State Aid provided by member states to industry and services, as shown in Table 6, is given
through grants (63% in 2019 in terms of value), followed by tax exemptions (31%). Falling well
behind those categories are other forms of aid, such as soft loans, equity investments, and
subsidized services. Nevertheless, the type of aid instrument varies depending on the country
granting the aid, as well as the type of policy objective the aid seeks to support and the market
failure it seeks to overcome. Table 6 provides a snapshot of the different aid instruments used by
EU Member States over a three-year period. With respect to the relationship between aid-type and
objective, a greater share of State Aid for RDI, for instance, tends comes in the form of direct
grants than is the case for State Aid for environmental protection.119
Table 6: Non-Crisis State Aid to Industry and Services by Aid Instrument and Member
State, Annual Average in Million Euros, 2015-2017120
Equity
Participation

Soft
Grants Guarantees loans

Tax
deferral

Tax
exemption

Total

European Union (28 countries)

585

63634 817

1155

9

31927

102202

Belgium

61

1125 0

30

0

1026

2243

Bulgaria

0

167

0

6

0

32

567

Czech Republic

0

1080 7

1

0

224

2307

Denmark

14

2042 0

17

0

1948

4045

27

29549 14

156

0

9797

39591

Estonia

0

153

0

0

0

47

201

Ireland

0

368

2

7

0

74

454

Greece

56

476

547

0

0

0

1079

Spain

0

1923 10

142

0

432

2518

France

103

6708 0

211

1

7400

15799

Germany (until 1990
territory of the FRG)

119
120

former

See State Aid Scoreboards covering data for 2017-2019.
Id.
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Croatia

0

217

Italy

51

Cyprus

0

8

0

31

393

2510 14

118

0

767

3706

0

107

0

0

0

7

115

Latvia

10

540

0

4

0

49

603

Lithuania

4

137

0

0

0

106

354

Luxembourg

0

145

0

0

0

0

169

Hungary

44

2023 0

7

0

159

2234

Malta

13

17

1

0

36

78

Netherlands

5

1414 6

62

9

386

1888

Austria

2

1305 8

11

0

450

1779

Poland

7

4123 0

13

0

843

4986

Portugal

10

200

0

293

0

150

813

Romania

1

469

2

10

0

201

1064

Slovenia

35

218

0

2

0

118

373

Slovakia

4

245

0

0

0

73

331

Finland

12

725

1

16

0

921

1678

Sweden

0

781

4

5

0

2929

3719

United Kingdom

126

4865 199

34

0

3722

9115

1
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Figure 8: Share of Total State Aid by Instruments, Excluding Aid to Agriculture, Fisheries,
and Railways Between 2009 and 2019 (in %)121

In addition to overall declines in the amount of State Aid provided since the 1980s, the “intensity”
of the aid has also shrunk.122 As is discussed further in Section 4, this is due to EU rules placing
ceilings on permissible levels of aid intensity. Areas that are the most disadvantaged and in need
of investment have the highest ceilings. The ceilings are further adjusted based on the size of the
firm benefitting from the State Aid. Despite the apparent reduction in overall State Aid and in aid
intensity, it is important to emphasize that State Aid does not include all types of incentives.
Measures that are likely to affect trade with firms outside the EU but not with EU states, for
example, would not be covered.
In conclusion, data reported by EU member states indicates that, likely due to the implementation
and enforcement of regulations:

121
122

•

data on the use of incentives covered by the State Aid scheme is not fully comprehensive,
but is relatively robust;

•

the use and intensity of non-crisis State Aid has declined in the EU since the 1980s, but has
risen slightly in recent years, partly due to reforms aimed at simplifying the use of State
Aid, and a significant rise in renewable energy initiatives in Member States;

•

there has been a dramatic shift toward the use of horizontal aid, which now accounts for
the vast majority of all non-crisis State Aid to industry and services; and

The EU Commission, State Aid Scoreboard 2020.
For more on the definition of aid intensity, see also Box 2.
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•

this shift reflects a greater use of incentives to address market failures and pursue specific,
previously identified goals important to the EU as opposed to more generally encouraging
new or supporting existing investment in a given sector or industry.

2.4 Investment Incentives in the Middle East and Northern Africa
The economic crises triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic added to what were already pressing
socioeconomic problems in parts of the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA). Inflows of FDI
into the region fell dramatically in 2020, and the OECD predicts there will be sharp increases in
already high unemployment and poverty, as well as a rising risk of macroeconomic, political, and
social instability in the region.123
MENA countries could attract FDI by taking advantage of their unique location, large market size,
and young workforce.124 In recent years, almost all governments of the MENA countries have
taken steps to improve business climate and address competition for investment from emerging
developing countries. Some of these measures have strengthened the capacity and role of
investment promotion agencies (IPAs) in attracting investors and streamlining the start-up and
expansion of investments. On the other front, tax and financial incentives are also widely used by
governments in MENA, as in many developing and emerging economies, to attract private
investment. A recent study from the OECD gives an overview of the different investment
incentives types available in the MENA economies, the instruments used, the stated objectives of
these incentives, and how they are implemented.125
According to the OECD study, MENA governments have been providing tax and financial
incentives primarily to agricultural, tourism, and industrial sectors, as well as export-oriented
activities and underdeveloped regions.126 Investor incentives that promote environmental
protection, are also common. Yet, compared to other OECD countries, there are fewer incentives
for firms to use new technologies or support technology transfer and R&D activities.127
Corporate tax holidays, reduced corporate tax rates, tax deductions, and credits are the most
common types of tax incentives used by MENA governments, which is consistent with trends in
other developing and emerging markets. Exemptions from indirect taxes, such as import and export
duties and VAT, are frequently used in addition to direct tax incentives.128
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OECD Middle East and North Africa Investment Policy Perspectives, OECD Publishing (2021), 15.
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The statutory CIT rate in MENA economies is 21% on average, with rates ranging from 15%
(Palestine) to 25% (Tunisia) (Figure 9). This is slightly lower than the OECD and ASEAN average
CIT rates of 25% and 23%, respectively.129
Figure 9: Statutory CIT Rates in MENA Economies130

Figure 10: Projects Eligible for Permanent Tax Holidays131
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Tax holidays are granted by all MENA governments (except Palestine) based on the location of
the investment, which can include underdeveloped areas and, more frequently, economic or free
zones. Also, with the exception of Egypt and Libya, the majority of countries offer tax holidays
based on industry, and half of them grant holidays based on specific economic activities (e.g.,
skills development, R&D, environmental protection). The maximum length of tax holidays
(including extensions) is around 10 years in most countries, except for Jordan, which grants
exemptions with a 30-year period. In comparison, tax holidays in ASEAN countries typically range
from four to twenty years (including extensions), with no permanent exemptions available.
MENA economies, on average, provide more permanent exemptions and longer tax holidays (14.6
years) than Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries (11 years), but they
receive less FDI. This emphasizes the importance of the overall investment climate in attracting
firms and raises questions about the value of broad-based, generous incentives.
Following the expiration of a tax holiday, businesses may be deemed eligible for reduced CIT rates
(non-zero tax rates that are lower than standard CIT rates) in five of the eight MENA economies.132
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Palestine, Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia.
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Figure 11: Statutory and Reduced CIT Rates in MENA Focus Economies133

In general, cost-based incentives (that reduce the cost investment for business) appear less
common in the MENA economies than profit-based benefits, which are the norm in most
developing and emerging economies. Yet, there is a scarcity of publicly available information on
these schemes, necessitating further investigation.
•

•
•

Egypt:134 In 2017, Egypt reformed its investment incentive regime to increase the use of
cost-based incentives and reduce the recourse to tax holidays.135 Investors can deduce up
to 50% of investment costs from taxable income for projects in low-income areas, and up
to 30% for investment in specific sectors (such as renewable energy and labor-intensive
projects).
Tunisia:136 Tunisia has the most tax deduction schemes, including those for reinvesting
profits in agriculture, innovative industries, and exporting businesses.
Algeria:137 Algeria provides tax deductions for investments made for research and
development.

According to the 2021 OECD study, most MENA countries grant all investors accelerated
depreciation of assets and loss-carry-forward schemes through the general regime. However, some
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countries, such as Algeria, follow a negative list approach to incentives, with over 100 sectors and
activities disqualified from receiving tax benefits.
Moreover, MENA countries use financial incentives to attract investment in specific sectors,
activities, and locations, though they are used less frequently than tax incentives.138 These financial
incentives include grants for infrastructure, staff training, land/building or equipment costs,
reduced financing139 for projects related to sustainable development, environmental protection or
renewable energy, as well as loan guarantees and interest subsidies, which have been used in
Algeria to promote tourism projects and in Lebanon to encourage businesses to relocate to
underdeveloped areas.140 Besides Tunisia, no legislation specifies the details of these incentives,
such as the amount of funds eligible firms can receive. The eligibility requirements in most
countries are also unclear.
2.5 Investment Incentives in (Sub-Saharan) Africa
According to the African Development Bank, the infrastructure investment gap in Africa is
estimated to be more than $100 billion per year, and will reach $170 billion per year by 2025,
adversely affecting Africans' living conditions and the continent's global competitiveness.141
Governments are eager to attract FDI that will contribute to filling this gap. Sub-Saharan African
countries provide a variety of enhanced tax incentives, including accelerated capital expenditure
allowances, special allowances for investments in specific industry sectors, and tax holidays
ranging from three to ten years. Almost all African governments offer tax incentives to boost their
manufacturing, agricultural, and industrial bases, while more advanced African economies also
provide incentives to attract financial services industries. Cash grants are not common, but stronger
economies such as South Africa and Nigeria still offer cash grants in addition to tax holidays – all
of which require government approval.142 In general, pre-qualification or pre-approval of the
investor by the respective country's regulatory agency is required in all countries, and in some
cases (such as Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Somalia), government
agencies are also willing to enter into tax agreements and/or cooperation agreements for
investment certainty.143
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In sub-Saharan Africa, 80% of countries offered tax holidays in 2015 (an increase from 40% in
1980), and 50% operated free zones, which did not exist 30 years prior.144 In 2017, 65% of subSaharan countries introduced more generous incentives, and 21% removed or restricted
incentives.145
Box 3 below describes the use of tax incentives in Africa to attract FDI in the extractive industry,
specifically.
Box 3: Cost of the Pervasive Use of Tax Incentives to Attract Extractive Industries in Africa
Why are companies asking for incentives in the extractive sector?
The extractive industry has long argued that it is a particularly risky and capital-intensive
industry and therefore deserves some special tax treatment. Some of its arguments include:
•

it has a long exploration period with no revenue;

•

capital outlays during the development and closure phases are higher in the extractive
industries than in other businesses;

•

after the construction of mines, capital is captive and not transportable;

•

equipment generally needs to be imported;

•

extractive projects span several decades and are thus exposed to risk related to changes
in political circumstances;

•

commodity prices, and therefore revenues, are cyclical;

•

companies must incur costs unrelated to production to obtain and maintain a social
license to operate.

What incentives are granted?
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Generally, extractive companies receive tax incentives in the following forms; lower tax rates,
reduced tax bases through special allowances; exemptions from paying certain types of taxes.
One particular regulatory incentive is also often applied by statute or agreement: stabilization of
the taxes, sometimes over the life of the contract. Governments may also agree to stabilize a
broader set of laws, or even all laws, affecting the project.

A 2015 study by the IMF, OECD, UN, and World Bank found that, without the tax incentives,
over 90% of investments would have still taken place in Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, and
Guinea.146 Incentives were found to be one of the least important factors in influencing an
investment decision in a study of 7,000 companies in 19 Sub-Saharan African countries.147
Robertson & Bredar concludes that potential impact of tax incentives in Africa is typically lesser
than any other region in the world on stimulating investment, except the Caribbean.148 While tax
incentives may be used to encourage foreign investment in the hopes of securing technology,
infrastructure, and high-skilled jobs,149 the documented domestic externalities have been
overwhelmingly negative in Africa due to poor implications of tax incentives and a lack of good
governance.
The KPMG report surveyed 37 African countries, all of which offered some tax incentives, and 23
of which offered SEZs or Export Free Zones. Only eight included a job creation requirement as
part of these incentives, and 12 included training incentives.150 This is especially concerning in
light of the global COVID-19 crisis, which has already strained revenues and heightened the urgent
need for increased domestic resource mobilization. Yet, manufacturing incentives are found in
more than a third of the 37 countries surveyed.151 African countries appear to be reforming their
incentive policies to include manufacturing incentives in order to attract manufacturing FDI.
Many African countries have disorganized and contradictory systems of granting various tax
exemptions under multiple pieces of legislation and agencies.152 For instance, there are ten
different government agencies in Ghana that can grant exemptions to investors, allowing them to
shop around departments.153 This has resulted in a "race to the bottom," with various agencies
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competing to offer the lowest rates.154 This “race to the bottom” problem is also seen at the regional
level, where countries with similar economic conditions compete for investment and gain no
additional revenue as a result of tax wars.
Also, the terms of tax incentive policies in Africa are criticized for being unclear, allowing for
corruption and erosion of any tax benefit. For example, according to the Tax Justice Network,
Tanzania's “Strategic Investor Status,” allows companies investing more than $20 million to
negotiate individual tax holidays.155 Further, the OECD pointed out the fact that “special
concessions to individual companies... have never been formally made public” with regard to the
incentives in Tanzania.156
Several studies acknowledge the lack of formal reporting of tax incentives. Most countries do not
keep a comprehensive list of tax exemptions.157 According to World Bank data from 2015, only
21% of countries in sub-Saharan Africa estimate forgone revenue through tax expenditures on a
regular basis.158 Only 28 African countries reported their tax expenditures to the public once or
more between 2000 and 2019, according to the Global Tax Expenditures Database.159 When
reporting is completed, there is still a problem with report quality, which includes the level of
detail, the definitions used, the quality of estimation methods used, and the frequency of
reporting.160 Improving the frequency and quality of tax expenditure reporting is difficult due to
weak institutions, data constraints, and limited human and financial resources.161
Further, exemptions are not always granted for economic reasons, but rather for political reasons,
as a reward for loyalty or in exchange for political gaining.162 In those cases, care for designing
incentives effectively, for instance, by lowering costs to developing marginal mines is absent, and
incentives are granted when investments would have been made anyways.163 While there have
been few studies on the relationship between politics and tax incentives, in Tanzania, a link was
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discovered between increased political competition during election periods and increased tax
exemptions.164
Box 4: Snapshot of Selected Countries in Africa: How Much Revenue Is Lost as a Result of
Tax Incentives?

Tanzania: The Bomani Commission estimated that the government lost US$31 million in 20067 and US$52 million in 2007-8 as a result of fuel levy exemptions granted to the six largest
mining companies.
Malawi: Tax incentives given to mining companies cost Malawi at least 8 times more than the
revenues received; a loss that could cover 60% of the costs of the Ministry of Health.
Sierra Leone: The government has offered two iron ore mines a tax rate of 20% in place of the
standard statutory tax rate of 30%. The country forewent an estimated US$131 million in revenue
between 2014 and 2016 due to this policy.
Cote d’Ivoire: After granting the Yaoure gold mine a five-year tax holiday, the government
developed a model to assess the cost of the incentive and concluded it had foregone US$129
million. The mine would have experienced a solid rate of return without the tax holiday.
One study pointed out that, in 2008 “tax incentives in sub-Saharan Africa [were] used more
widely than in the 1980s, with more than two-thirds of the countries in the region providing tax
holidays to attract investment. Such incentives not only shrink the tax base but also complicate
tax administration and are a major source of revenue loss and leakage from the taxed
economy.” Compounding those problems, tax incentives are often granted through special
agreements negotiated behind closed doors, without the consent of or engagement with tax
authorities.

Most recently, various governments have enacted laws and policies relating to renewable energy
tax incentives in a variety of ways, the most notable of which are165:
(i) Investment tax incentives, (ii) production tax incentives, (iii) property tax reductions, (iv) VAT
tax reductions, (v) excise (sales) tax reductions, (vi) import duty reductions, (vii) accelerated
depreciation, (viii) research, development, demonstration and equipment manufacturing tax
incentives, (ix) tax holidays, (x) taxes on conventional fuels.
164
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Box 5: Tax Incentives in the Renewable Energy Sector in Selected Countries166

Madagascar: The Madagascar Tax Code of 2015 provides for the following renewable energy tax
incentives:
a. A 50% reduction in corporate income tax on investment;
b. A VAT exemption on equipment used in the production of renewable energy. Wind power
generators, hydropower generators, solar water heaters, and solar PV panels are examples of
equipment; and
c. With the exception of buildings, equipment can be depreciated at a 30% rate of net value.
South Africa: The South African Income Tax Act establishes a number of fiscal incentives for the
renewable energy industry. Allowances for a. Energy efficiency savings (Section 12L); b. Capital
allowance for renewable energy machinery (Section 12B); c. Exemption of certified emission
reductions (Section 12K); d. Allowance for industrial policy projects (Section 12I); and e. A variety
of tax incentives for the proposed special economic zones SEZs (Section 12R).
Malawi: The Malawi Customs and Excise (Tariffs) Order has been amended to include a zero-rate
VAT on solar panels, solar batteries, solar inverters, solar bulbs, solar regulators, solar
accumulators, and energy efficient bulbs.
Rwanda: The Rwanda Investment Code provides for a seven-year tax holiday for energy projects
with a capacity of at least 25 megawatts. The investment must be at least $50 million USD, with
the investor contributing at least 30% of this amount in the form of equity in these sectors. A list
of clean energy equipment exempt from VAT is provided by the Minister of Finance and Planning.
Sierra Leone: The Finance Act establishes a three-year duty-free period for the importation of
photovoltaic system equipment and low-energy or energy-efficient appliances for resale or use by
third parties.
Kenya: The Kenya Finance Act of 2021 amends the Value Added Tax Act's First Schedule to
exempt solar and wind energy specialized equipment from taxation. This came after a 14% VAT
on solar equipment was imposed in 2020, making solar products unaffordable and discouraging the
implementation of universal electrification. The new law puts the country back on track to
achieving green energy goals.
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Figure 12: Tax Incentives in the Renewable Energy Sector in Africa167
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East Africa
In 2012, ActionAid and Tax Justice Network Africa reported on lost revenue by East African
countries to tax incentives for foreign corporations, estimating these losses at US$2.8 billion a year
across four countries—Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda.168 Their 2016 report tracked new
developments in tax policy in these four countries plus Burundi, and found that they are still losing
between US$1.5 billion and US$2 billion a year.169
In Kenya,170 the Special Economic Zone Act of 2015 increased the number of SEZs in the country.
This act exempts companies within SEZs from all taxes and duties payable under the Excise Duty
Act, Income Tax Act, EAC Customs Management Act, and the BAT Act. Due to the lack of
transparency in the Kenyan tax regime, there is no updated number on lost revenue to tax
incentives since the 2012 estimate, which was US$1.1 billion.
Under the VAT Act 2013 and VAT (Amendment) Act 2014, Kenya offers an exemption from the
VAT and import duties for supplies imported or bought for the construction of a power-generating
plant or for geothermal exploration, as well as certain plant and machinery. Pursuant to the VAT
acts, solar cells and modules that are not equipped with elements such as diodes, batteries or similar
equipment are free from import duty and exempt from VAT; PV semi-conductor devices,
including PV cells and light-emitting diodes, together with wind-powered generating sets that have
already been assembled, are subject to a 5% import duty and 16% VAT; Wind engines (windmills)
are free from import duty and exempt from VAT; Hydraulic turbines and water wheels are free
from import duty but pay 16% VAT.
In Tanzania171, revenue losses from tax incentives granted in 2014-15 were estimated at US$790
million, or 1.5% of GDP (2% was lost in 2013-14). This number does not take into account a new
VAT law which will allegedly result in tax revenues of $500 million. This VAT Act (2015) reduces
the number of items and companies that are eligible for VAT exemptions. New investors in EPZs
and SEZs will not be eligible for VAT exemptions. EPZs and SEZs continue to exist, and
companies there are exempted for the first 10 years from paying all taxes and levies imposed by
local government authorities, and from corporate income taxes. In addition, companies are granted
import duty exemptions on raw materials and capital goods imported for manufacturing goods. Oil
and gas investors are given special treatment. Exemptions for multinational companies engaged in
natural gas and oil exploration amounted to US$58.8 million in 2013-14. The new Tax
Administration Act restricts power to the Minister to grant tax exemptions, and publishes quarterly
168
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tax exemption reports to increase transparency, though it does not make public CIT exemptions or
other exemptions granted within EPZs.
Uganda172 has also taken steps to reduce VAT and other exemptions, but many incentives remain,
notably, as in other East African countries, for oil companies. In 2015, Uganda exempted oil
companies from paying VAT in the exploration and construction phases. More generally, investors
located in export zones are entitled to a 10-year tax holiday, duty exemption on raw materials, and
no export tax, among other exemptions.173 There are also capital and depreciation allowances, and
customs duty and tax exemptions. Uganda’s policies are more targeted than those of Kenya and
Tanzania. It offers corporate income tax holidays for certain categories of businesses, such as
companies engaged in agro-processing and those exporting finished consumer and capital
goods.174 Through recent tax reforms, the government expects to increase tax collections by 0.7%
of GDP.
Rwanda175 introduced a new 2015 Investment Code that offers extensive tax incentives to foreign
investors. Revenue loss from incentives is estimated at US$115-176 million a year. At present,
Rwanda only raises 15% of its GDP in taxes.
Burundi176 is especially vulnerable to harmful incentives because of its position as a poor country
with a small population and subsequently small tax base. Revenue loss from incentives presently
offered to international and domestic companies is impossible to calculate due to the scarcity of
data. However, the high fiscal deficit in Burundi in 2018 was attributed in part to weak tax
collection by African Development Bank.177 While incentives are currently offered through tax
deferrals and duties exemptions, positive reforms have been made in recent years. In 2007, Burundi
joined the East Africa Community (EAC) common market, which, in combination with the closure
of certain tax loopholes, has helped increase revenues from tax collection.178
West Africa
Tax holidays are the most common type of incentive in Western African countries. In 2015,
ActionAid and Tax Justice Network179 released a report examining corporate tax incentives and
their impact on the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with a focus on
four countries: Nigeria, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal.
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Despite serious doubts about the effectiveness of corporate tax incentives in achieving economic
goals and the costs to national budgets, the report found that they continue to be a popular policy
tool in ECOWAS member states.180According to the study, Corporate tax incentives – tax
reductions offered by governments to entice investment – have a significant impact on domestic
revenue collection and are not required to attract foreign direct investment (FDI).181 Their analyses
estimate that three countries – Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal – collectively lose up to $5.8 billion
per year.182
West African states provide both formal and off-the-books or discretionary corporate tax
incentives in special deals with businesses.183 For example, in Senegal, for investments exceeding
250 billion CFA francs, the government may grant a special tax and customs regime exempting
the investor from the benefits of the investment and mining codes.184 In Liberia, certain incentives
of up to 15 years may be granted for investments exceeding USD 10 million, subject to presidential
and legislative approval.185
Tax holidays are given to as many as 46% of the 40 companies surveyed in Ghana, Nigeria, and
Cote d’Ivoire: 10% of businesses are exempt from paying corporate income tax entirely, while the
remaining 10% pay a reduced rate.186 To encourage export-led growth, a large percentage of
investors receive export tax exemptions or subsidies.
West African countries tax only 10-15% of their GDP on average, compared to 25-30% for the
southern African countries.187 Because governments in the region continue to be strapped for cash,
some have turned to VAT to make up for revenue lost due to incentives. As a result, VAT rates in
West Africa are relatively high. The Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine (UEMOA),
a group of Francophone countries in ECOWAS that share the CFA currency, has set a VAT band
of 15 to 20% for the French West African region. Ghana levies 17.5% VAT, while only Nigeria
has managed to keep its VAT at 5%, thanks to labor union opposition to government attempts to
raise it from 5% to 10% in 2007. 188
ActionAid report also pointed out that tax incentives are frequently administered by multiple,
uncoordinated entities in each country and are granted based on whim rather than cost-benefit
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analysis.189 Despite years of providing generous incentives to investors, most ECOWAS countries
have failed to achieve their goals of increased job creation and employment. Hence, foreign direct
investment into West Africa has risen, but not in the industries that generate the most jobs, such
as manufacturing. Neither corporate tax incentives nor the availability of natural resources, such
as oil and gas, drive such investment.
In addition to the shared type of incentive, such as exemptions or tax holidays, many Western
African countries also offer creative – and unorthodox types of incentives. For instance, in Sierra
Leone, the government - through the Central Bank, organizes weekly non-cash foreign exchange
auctions in order to improve transparency and efficiency in foreign exchange transactions and
achieve a market-determined foreign exchange rate. While such auctions are primarily intended to
allow the Central Bank to efficiently inject foreign exchange into the market, they also provide a
window for other economic agents to sell foreign exchange at market rates.190
2.6 Investment Incentives in ASEAN, China, and India
Southeast Asia outperforms the rest of the world in terms of exports and FDI inflows and has been
a top destination for multinational corporations from all over the world for at least the last three
decades.191
In 2019, the OECD released a study analyzing the collected information regarding incentives used
in Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and
Vietnam.192 The report points out that the policy stance of national governments has had a
significant impact on Southeast Asia's economic performance. Through a combination of
incentives, selective liberalization, and strong investment protection guarantees, many countries
in the region were early movers in welcoming FDI for its contribution to exports.193
Investment tax incentives are widely used in all ASEAN Member States and have been for a long
time. Singapore was the first to move in 1967, and other countries quickly followed, including the
Philippines and Indonesia in 1967, Malaysia in 1968, and Thailand in 1972.194 Governments have
refined and reformed their legal infrastructure over time, opening up more sectors to foreign
investment and clarifying protection provisions. Currently, all ASEAN Member States provide
income tax holidays. Also, tax deductions, credits or both are also used by all the members.
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Average corporate income tax rates in ASEAN are down to 23%, from 26% in 2009. This is lower
than the OECD average of 25%.195 In China, the statutory rate of enterprise income tax is 25%.196
In India, while domestic companies are subject to tax at a basic rate of 30%, the net income of
foreign companies is taxed at 40% plus the 2% or 5% surcharge, as applicable.197 Thailand and
Vietnam have reduced their CIT rates by 10% and 8%, respectively, since 2006.198 All countries
in Southeast Asia have higher contributions of corporate taxes to total GDP than the average for
OECD countries (7%). Furthermore, the OECD found that, for all ASEAN countries, the
difference between tax rates with and without incentives is above 10 percentage points.199
Figure 13: Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rate (in %) 200

Corporate investors can take advantage of income tax holidays in all ASEAN Member States, with
various qualifying criteria, and with the maximum number of years ranging from four, in Vietnam,
to 20 years in Indonesia.201 Income tax holidays are also offered in India and China; in India,
investors can qualify for tax holidays for up to 20 years if they meet certain conditions;202 while in
China, the tax holiday for qualified enterprises (or qualified projects) can be extended to 10 years
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(exemption for the first five years and a 50% reduction for the next five years).203 Singapore,
Brunei Darussalam, and Indonesia, also have very generous tax holiday programs.204 Singapore
offers a maximum tax holiday of 15 years, but only for income streams derived from specific
pioneering activities.205
The OECD report also shows that the cost of tax holidays in ASEAN member states reaches a
considerable amount, especially compared to the other regions of the world. For instance,
Cambodia, whose incentives are made up mostly of tax holidays, experiences a revenue loss of
6% of its GDP to these incentives. Vietnam and the Philippines each lose 1%.206
Complete tax holidays are also allowed in many South-eastern Asian EPZs and SEZs. China, India,
and all of ASEAN Member States (with the exception of Brunei) also have SEZs, or incentives
that are differentiated regionally to help underdeveloped areas. EPZs tend to offer substantial tax
holidays and import duty exemptions, ergo companies can be exempted from customs duties and
taxes on both exports and imports.207
On the other hand, tax deductions, credits, or both are used by all ASEAN Member States. In India,
companies can get tax exemptions and deductions, if they meet certain requirements as well. In
terms of the number of schemes that allow for tax deductions and credits, Vietnam has one of the
most comprehensive regime in this category.208 For instance, corporate income tax paid in foreign
countries, as well as certain projects employing women or ethnic minorities, are eligible for tax
credits in Vietnam.209 Cambodia and the Lao People's Democratic Republic, on the other hand,
use deduction and credit schemes much less frequently among ASEAN countries; as an alternative
to tax holidays, Cambodia offers accelerated depreciation, while Lao PDR provides a tax credit on
reinvested profits and certain types of losses.210
Where achieving development objectives is concerned, many of these instruments may be effective
in attracting investment, but the OECD holds that they are costly when considering the forgone
revenue a host state could be using to pursue the advancement of such development objectives on
its own. That having been said, evidence suggests that cost-based instruments, such as tax
deductions and tax credits, are preferable to profit-based instruments such as tax holidays and tax
reductions. This is because instruments like tax holidays favor firms with high profits that need
less government support. The most developed ASEAN countries, such as Malaysia, Singapore,
203
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and Thailand, use cost-based incentives more often than the less developed countries such as
Myanmar and Cambodia. 211
Tax incentives in ASEAN countries are increasingly targeted towards specific sectors, as well as,
notably, specific development objectives.212 While some targeted incentive policies can be quite
broad (for example, they could aim to attract any or all exporters or manufacturers), some countries
list incentives for a number of key sectors. Some countries use incentive instruments in a
differentiated manner across sectors. 213 Where investment is resource specific (in the case of
extractives, for example), incentives are less likely to impact an investor’s decision of where to
locate operations.214
Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand use tax incentives to promote environmental protection, attract
technology, and other development objectives.
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Figure 14: Extent of Tax Incentive Targeting Across ASEAN215

Finally, some incentives are targeted specifically at foreign investors. Some of the following
countries offered such incentives in 2019:216
•

In Vietnam, the standard corporate tax rate of 20% can be reduced as low as 10% for a
15 year period as well as additional incentives.

•

In Indonesia, foreign investors in pioneer industries can receive tax incentives ranging
from 50% to 100% for a period of 5-20 years.

•

In China, companies can receive a number of different tax holidays, including a 5-year
holiday for investments in special economic zones, and certain high technology
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investments can qualify for a 5-year holiday and an additional 5-year 50% reduction in
corporate income taxes.
Box 6: Investment Incentives for Agriculture and Agro-Processing in Africa and Asia
A survey of incentives regimes of 19 countries in Africa and Asia217 implemented by the Columbia
Center on Sustainable Investment highlights the widespread implementation of tax incentives to
promote investment in agriculture and agro-processing.218 For example, 18 of the 19 countries offer
some kind of corporate tax deductions to encourage investment. Seven countries offer a version of
a tax holiday and 15 provide import duty exemptions for raw goods imported to manufacture or
export agricultural products. Although financial incentives, such as loans, appear to be less
common in the countries reviewed, they are still used to attract investment in both agriculture and
agro-industry processing. For example, Zambia provides financial incentives for farm works and
farm improvement,219 while Taiwan offers a special loan program for investments in agriculture
technology parks with the goal of expanding the nation’s agro-industry.220
Land-related incentives, especially regarding tenure, are an additional type of incentive frequently
used for the agricultural sector. Land tenure rules can affect how foreign investors view the
attractiveness of a country with respect to agricultural investments. Here, too, government policies
vary: for example, while Thailand allows foreign ownership of land,221 many other countries
prohibit this, providing instead for long-term leases by foreigners. Myanmar’s newly enacted
Foreign Investment Law caps long-term leases at 50 years (with possible extensions),222 while
Tanzania allows foreigners to engage in large-scale, long-term leases for up to 99 years.223
Furthermore, because foreigners are not permitted to own land in Tanzania, the Tanzania
Investment Centre established a land bank, containing over one million hectares of land to lease
for foreign agricultural investment.224 Such rules governing rights to use land, coupled with more
traditional investment incentives, may factor into how investors view agricultural sector
opportunities.
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Section 3: Effectively Designing Investment
Incentives Programs
3.1 The Challenges of Cost-Benefit Analyses
As Sections 1 and 2 covered, countries (and the jurisdictions within them) provide a range of
incentives to different types of investors, both domestic and foreign. Whether these incentive
packages make for good policy is another question altogether, and one that requires analysis of
each policy’s associated costs and benefits. There will, of course, be distributional and temporal
implications to these costs and benefits; how costs and benefits are enjoyed or shouldered by
different constituencies over time will not be uniform and should therefore be accounted for in
analyses.
Governments can take steps to identify and weigh the factors required to assess the costs and
benefits of incentives and then decide which strategies to adopt in order to avoid the losses from
incentives. The variables presented in this section can be measured and analyzed using a variety
of techniques, though it is not an easy task and is not frequently done (See Section 3.2). Box 7
below shows how the costs and benefits of incentive programs are evaluated in the U.S., presenting
evidence from Pew Center’s research. Box 8 addresses EU’s cost-benefit analysis for the State Aid
program as shown by a recent ex-post evaluation.
Box 7: Inadequate Cost-Benefit Analyses in the United States
The Pew Center on the States’ research facilitates an examination of U.S. practices in evaluating its
incentive programs.
In one study,225 the Pew Center reviewed 16 hefty tax incentive bills passed by U.S. States between
2007 and 2011 and researched whether (1) reliable cost estimates and (2) annual spending limits were
used. The research found that:
•

in only four cases were both tools used;

•

five of the bills were enacted without either of these fiscal safeguards;

•

in seven cases, the legislation only used one of those measures.
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In another study,226 the Pew Center examined whether policy makers were getting the information
necessary to understand if tax incentives were delivering the expected return on investments. To that
end, it reviewed roughly 600 documents from state agencies and legislative committees and
interviewed 175 policy makers, agency officials and experts. It found:
•

only four states – Arizona, Iowa, Oregon, and Washington – integrated evaluation of their
major incentives into a policy process ensuring that incentive deals were regularly reviewed
(between five and ten years);

•

twelve states reviewed all major tax incentives but failed to use the data to inform policy
choices;227

•

thirty-five did not review all the major tax incentives or use data to inform policy choices.

The Pew Center also highlighted leading examples that could provide lessons learned for other states:

226

•

under an Oregon law, tax credits expire every six years. Although they can be renewed, the
expiration term provides policy makers and other stakeholders an opportunity to critically
review and assess the desirability of renewing any or all of their incentive programs;

•

in 2007, Washington began a 10-year review process for every tax incentive offered. Pursuant
to that process, each year nonpartisan analysts and a citizen commission collaborate to review
a group of incentives and provide recommendations to lawmakers regarding whether and how
the incentives should change;

•

in assessing the job creation associated with incentive deals, Louisiana took into account the
effects on businesses that did not receive incentives. The finding was that some newly created
jobs displaced existing positions as a result of distorted competition between the businesses
that were given incentives and those that were not;
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•

in 2010, Connecticut’s economic development agency assessed the state’s major tax credits
and concluded that some were not meeting the intended outcomes, but others were beneficial
and cost-effective. The review resulted in some of the incentives being eliminated.

•

In 2013, Rhode Island passed legislation requiring all new incentives to be regularly
evaluated. The 2018 evaluation made a number of concrete recommendations for the reform
of their investment programs.

•

In 2017, Pennsylvania’s General Assembly passed a bill mandating a review of incentive
programs. The first review of these programs has already led to policy changes.

Box 8: Lessons from the Cost-Benefit Analysis of the EU State Aid, 2007-2013
A review of 28 investment projects that were granted EU State Aid for regional development
illustrates the role of cost-benefit analysis techniques, indicating that they are being employed, but
not fully or by all granting authorities, leaving projects without adequate ex-ante economic
assessments or ex-post evaluations.228 This review covered projects in six industries and seven
member states that were carried out between 2002 and 2010. The case studies included (1) seven
investment projects in the pharmaceutical industry in Ireland; (2) three investment projects in the
solar industry in Germany; (3) three investment projects in the car industry in Slovakia and
Hungary; (4) eight investment projects in internal business services in Poland; (5) two investment
projects in the cement industry in Hungary; and (6) five investment projects in the pulp and paper
industry in Spain and Portugal. Among the study’s findings are that certain agencies are more
diligent about conducting cost-benefit analyses of projects and incentives offers than others, but
that in no case was there actually a careful review of the “incentive effect” – i.e., whether the
incentive would impact investors’ investment or locational decisions. It also determined that while
some jurisdictions controlled the discretion of the granting authority to negotiate and renegotiate
incentives packages, others took a more flexible approach, loosening controls over efforts to ensure
that the incentives provide value for money and were used to meet intended objectives.229
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3.2 Gauging the Costs and Benefits of Investment Tax Incentives230
Tax incentives have both direct and indirect costs. The direct fiscal costs of a tax incentive are the
revenue losses experienced as a result of giving the tax benefits to an investor that would have
invested anyway.231 While direct costs are fraught with challenges, the indirect costs, which can
also be substantial, are even more difficult to measure. Indirect costs include:
•

the time and money spent by businesses lobbying the government for tax incentives;

•

the time and money spent by businesses applying for and receiving tax incentives;

•

the distortions caused by encouraging new investments that are detrimental to existing
ones;

•

revenue lost to illegal activity, such as when businesses that do not qualify for tax
exemptions falsify information to do so, or indirect revenue lost to businesses that do not
qualify for tax incentives but are nonetheless illegal.

•

additional costs for authorities responsible for administering tax incentives.232

Both direct and indirect benefits are possible. The creation of jobs by investors who changed their
investment decision as a result of the tax incentive is one benefit that is relatively simple to
measure. Other spillover benefits can also accrue, such as:
•

increasing investments in technology – such as research and development or high-tech
industries – that upgrade worker skills;

•

promoting investments in infrastructure projects that facilitate further economic growth;

•

channeling investments to create jobs in areas with high unemployment;

•

encouraging investments in environmentally friendly technology; and

•

securing anchor investments – i.e., investments, those that provide multiplier effects
through signaling and by creating backward linkages into the local economy.233
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Although these positive externalities, like the negative ones, are often challenging to calculate, it
is nevertheless important to consider them when assessing the desirability of an incentive.
Figure 15 illustrates a cost-benefit analysis examining these issues. The concept of “marginal
investment is being used, and it represents the investment that would not have been made if the
tax incentives were not provided. Using that concept to evaluate the desirability of a tax incentive,
one could generally conclude that an investment incentive is beneficial if the left side of the
equation is greater than the right. Governments should account for the costs both of “marginal
investors” (those who would not have made the investment without the incentive) and of “inframarginal investors” (those that would have made the investment without the incentive that they
received). Note, however, that this measurement focuses only on economic costs and benefits, and
does not account for other social and environmental considerations, which can alter that equation.
Figure 15: The Basic Equation of the Cost-Benefit Analysis

Reproduced from James, 2009
When deciding whether to offer incentives and, if so, how much to offer, governments could also
take a wider range of costs and benefits-related factors into account. Figure 16 illustrates a number
of these quantifiable and unquantifiable factors.
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Figure 16: Framework to Assess Benefits and Costs234
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3.2.1 Using Jobs Created as a Measure for the Cost-Effectiveness of Tax Incentives
One narrower approach to a cost-benefit analysis is to assess the jobs created as a result of tax
incentives. While less comprehensive than the analysis shown in figures 13 and 14 , job creation
analysis may be easier for a government to conduct. The impact of tax incentives on employment
can be evaluated in a variety of ways. We suggest, at the very least, that the assessed benefits'
value be restricted to jobs produced by "marginal investors" and that the assessed costs take into
account the value of lost profits from investments that would have been made in the absence of
incentives.
Such calculations should yield the revenue cost for each job created. There are three main ways to
conduct this calculation, depending on the data that is available:
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•

Jobs created by marginal investors [Benefits]/revenue cost as measured by the percentage
of non-marginal investors multiplied by the total tax expenditures [Costs].235

•

Jobs created by marginal investors [Benefits]/revenue cost as measured by the actual tax
expenditures incurred by the non-marginal investors [Costs].236

•

Jobs created by all the investors benefiting from tax incentives [Benefits] /total tax
expenditures [Costs].237

Though the revenue cost per job created indicator does not entirely cover all the costs or all the
benefits, it provides a rough figure that can help policy makers decide if the incentive is
worthwhile. Several country studies have shown the cost per job to be high. For instance, a 2013
Trade and Competitiveness study in El Salvador found the cost of incentives per job to be
US$2,084.238 This was attained as the ratio between the US$20,482,980 spent on infra-marginal
investors (who would have invested anyway) and the 9,831 jobs created by marginal investors
(who wouldn’t have invested without them). In the case of Tunisia, it was found that the cost of
tax incentives for each job created was three and a half times the per capita income.239
Another method for evaluating the jobs created as a result of incentives looks at the percentage of
jobs created by marginal investors as compared to total jobs created. One caveat to the methods
described above is that there are a number of practical and policy issues associated with a focus
on the “marginal investor.” For one, identifying the marginal investor is a difficult exercise given
that a firm seeking to convince policy makers of the usefulness of incentives has reason to declare
itself a marginal investor. Some scholars240 have suggested that, in order to receive more genuine
and illuminating answers, rather than phrasing the redundancy question as “Would you have made
this investment had you not received incentives from the host country?” it should be phrased as
“Would you have made this investment had you not received incentives from the host country
assuming other countries offered the same incentives?”
In addition, some warn that “marginal investor”-based analysis could cause negative policy signals
and outcomes. More specifically, they argue that offering incentives only to “marginal investors,”
for example, in order to attract a business to a site in which it otherwise would not have located
235
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encourages companies to pit jurisdiction against each other, driving them to engage in potentially
costly bidding wars. Additionally, it may effectively penalize businesses that do not shop for
incentives by threatening to relocate.241
Nevertheless, identifying the “marginal investor” is at very least a useful tool for assessing the
utility and efficiency of investment incentives.
3.2.2 Possible Extensions of the Jobs Created Methodology
Other benefits from investments, like diversification and skill development, are more difficult to
measure than job creation. However, it is possible to provide similar estimated cost-benefit
analyses as follows:242
•

Improvement of job quality/value-add per job.
Multiply the jobs created by the marginal investors in different categories by the salary
paid to the staff in each of these categories, where the salary is the proxy of the value
added.

•

Indirect creation of jobs across incentivized industries.
Multiply the jobs created by the marginal investors by a factor that captures the indirect
jobs created, which could vary by sector.

•

Creation of new skills and research jobs.
Estimate the jobs created under different categories, including research jobs and use the
same metric of the cost to create these jobs. Alternatively, for costs, estimate the revenue
forgone for each of the patents that the tax incentives have incentivized.

3.3 Assessing Costs and Benefits Outside the Granting Authority’s Jurisdiction
In addition to the costs and benefits for the jurisdiction providing the incentive, incentives can also
have external effects. By forcing them into "races to the bottom" in investment incentives or by
causing them to lose tax revenue as a result of transfer pricing practices, incentives may indirectly
impose costs on other jurisdictions. However, they can also be advantageous because they promote
foreign investment in fields or pursuits that might not otherwise be pursued and result in
advantageous spillovers in the home, host, and even third-party countries.
There are procedures and rules for evaluating how incentives affect regions outside the jurisdiction
of the grantor. As further outlined in Section 4, EU regulations on State Aid take into account how
241
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incentives granted by one member state affect other states within the EU. Another pertinent
example is the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation's (OPIC) policy of evaluating the
effects of the investments it supports both domestically and internationally. In order to promote
investments that are socially and environmentally responsible in developing nations, where such
support is most likely not provided, the U.S. government established OPIC. Projects must annually
show, in order to receive OPIC support, that they will not have impermissibly negative effects in
the United States or cause a net loss of American jobs, as well as the degree to which they will or
do have favorable effects in their host countries. 243
To evaluate the impacts on the home country, the OPIC questionnaires ask for annual reports on
information such as:
•

whether the project has a monopoly position in the home country (or any other market);

•

whether the project will, at its inception as well as throughout the course of its operations,
procure goods or services from U.S. suppliers and, if so, in what amounts and from what
types of suppliers (for example, whether the enterprise is minority- or female-owned,
whether it is a small business, etc.);

•

whether there will be remittances, including how much of it will go to the United States;
and,

•

whether the project will result in job losses in the United States.

To assess impacts on the host country, investment projects seeking OPIC support must complete
questionnaires that ask whether the project:
•

relates to activities or products that may be subject to domestic or international regulation
and may be banned, phased out, or restricted due to their negative impacts on health or the
environment;

•

will employ men or women, skilled or unskilled labor, domestic or foreign workers, and
temporary or permanent employees;

•

will be situated in any environmentally sensitive area or areas of national or regional
importance;
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•

will provide "ancillary" benefits or services not directly related to business activities, such
as charitable donations or activities, scholarship programs, recreational facilities, schools,
or medical clinics;

•

will train workers and, if so, what percentage of workers they will train and what types of
training they will provide;

•

will result in restructuring that entails the dismissal of employees in the host country;

•

will have human resources staff and policies, offer benefits like healthcare, and go above
and beyond what is legally required under domestic law in terms of those benefits;

•

will provide workers with training and, if so, what percentage of workers they will train
and what types of training they will provide;

•

will provide new or unusual management practices, marketing or distribution strategies,
production or processing methods, or products or services as a means of transferring
technology to the host nation;

•
•

will offer technical support or training to clients, business partners, or suppliers;
will offer instruction on international industry certifications and standards; and

•

will reinvest profits back into the host nation.

This questionnaire illustrates some of the potential impacts of outward investment on host and
home countries, and ways that granting jurisdictions can measure the costs and benefits of
incentives encouraging such investment. Presently, however, cost-benefit analyses of incentives
for outward investment appear to be conducted even less frequently than analyses of incentives
used to attract inward investment.
3.4 Policies for Minimizing Costs and Maximizing Benefits of Tax Incentives244
Cost-benefit analyses are crucial for helping governments evaluate the desirability of existing or
potential future incentives grants or programs. Importantly, various policy strategies can shape the
weight of costs and benefits. This section highlights several key considerations that governments
can take into account when seeking to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of the
incentives they offer. These include reducing administrative costs and opportunities for tax
evasion; carefully matching incentives to desired targets and needs; and avoiding tax holidays,
which tend to be particularly wasteful incentives.
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3.4.1 Reduce Administrative Costs and Opportunities for Evasion Through a Broad,
Uniform System
A good tax system is stable, ensures predictable revenue for the government, and minimizes
distortions in investment decisions. There is broad consensus that applying tax instruments with
reasonable tax rates over a broad base is sound policy. Paradoxically, that approach rules out all
tax incentives.
Silvana and Baer note that in many developing countries, a tax system with few taxes, a limited
number of rates for each tax, limited exemptions, and a broad base has proven much easier to
administer and resulted in higher compliance than a complex tax system.245 Similarly, aiming for
a global tax with few exemptions, credits, rebates, or deductions, avoiding attempting to achieve
too many social and economic goals, and being continuously monitored are some other
recommendations made by experts for the ideal tax system.246
“Having few exemptions limits the need to verify case-by-case compliance with the conditions
under which exemptions are granted. Differential treatment greatly increases information
requirements for the tax administration, provides opportunities for misreporting, and complicates
tax compliance requirements. Furthermore, costs and complexity of tax administration increase if
the tax system is used to achieve nonrevenue goals. Tax concessions for nonrevenue objectives
should be used very selectively and only after comparing their effectiveness with alternative
expenditure, subsidy, or regulatory instruments that can potentially achieve the same goals.”247
That said, political economy considerations and short-term constraints may be strong forces
driving countries to offer some kind of tax incentives. Moreover, some experts have argued that
governments should have fewer neutral policies because not all investments are the same and some
incentives may be needed to overcome obstacles and market failures.248
3.4.2 Match Incentives to Particular Region/Country Characteristics, Targets, and Needs
In order to be effective and help governments meet their policy goals, incentive programs should
be designed to account for the needs and characteristics of the granting jurisdiction in the near and
long term. Table 7 summarizes desirable short- and long-term incentive policies for countries
facing a variety of conditions.
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Table 7: Incentive Policies Under Various Country Scenarios249
Country Scenario

Short-Term Policy

Long-Term Policy

Countries with a Investment
incentives
are
very
weak ineffective and therefore lead to a
investment climate
waste of tax revenues. Tax
revenues instead should be used to
create public goods. Reforms
should also be introduced to
rationalize the tax system, the tax
instruments, and the rates as well
the tax administration.
Countries facing tax Incentives may be used to ensure
competition
that the country is not at a
disadvantage to its neighbors.250

Country should work to reduce
barriers to investment and focus
on simplifying investment
process widely.

Countries planning Countries may use incentives that
to diversify their are linked to investment growth
economy
(investment allowance, accelerated
depreciation, etc.) but only for a
limited period based on clear
prioritization of sectors in line with
FDI competitiveness.

Broader industrial policy strategies
must be followed, including a
focus on sector targeting and
promotion for investment.

Countries possessing
unique advantages
(natural
beauty,
natural resources)

Barriers should be appropriately
lowered for investments designed
to exploit the natural resource,
access to land, good quality
infrastructure, etc.

General investment incentives to
attract investments that exploit
such advantages waste revenue,
unless they kick-start investment.

Such countries should work on
regional pacts to stop harmful tax
competition. Countries should also
work on marketing the more
substantive differentiations, e.g.,
labor, skills, infrastructure, or
develop
a
unique
selling
proposition.

Reproduced from James, 2013
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3.4.3 Avoid Tax Holidays
In particular, tax holidays – although a popular incentive – should be avoided as they have
numerous disadvantages, including251:
•

“Tax holidays are a blanket benefit unrelated to the amount of capital invested or its growth
during the holiday. An alternative is to set minimum capital investment or growth
requirements to receive a tax holiday.

•

Firms have an incentive to close and sell their businesses at the end of the tax holiday –
only to reopen as a “new” investment, thus gaining an indefinite tax holiday.

•

If FDI operates under double taxation agreements, tax holidays simply transfer tax
revenues from the country receiving the investments to the investor’s home country.

•

Tax holidays enable firms to funnel profits, using transfer pricing (see Box 9), from an
existing profitable company through the “tax holiday” company and so avoid paying taxes
on either.

•

Most capital-intensive investments do not yield a profit until several years after operations
start. Thus, tax holidays for a “start-up” period of five years are ineffective. Indeed, tax
liabilities often kick in just about when a business starts to make a profit.”

Box 9: Incentives and Investment in India: The Role of Institutions and Issue of Transfer
Pricing252
Incentives for exporters were removed by the Indian government in 2000, with the exception of
those who were based in export processing zones or who met the criteria for export-oriented units.
Businesses that lost their incentives quickly changed their investment behavior. Firms from the
zones and export-oriented units, which were very similar, served as a control group for the study
of these changes. Only the garment exporters from one Indian state (Tamil Nadu) were examined
in order to compare them to other businesses.
Despite higher tax rates, companies that lost their incentives continued to invest the same amount.
Similar patterns were seen in the control group, proving that the removal of incentives had no
impact on investments.
In the group that lost incentives, reported pre-tax profits decreased by 50% despite hardly any
changes in business metrics like sales or the percentage of exports. Incentives did not cause pre251
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tax profits to decrease; instead, only the amount reported did, as shown by tax audits. This suggests
that investors increased their tax evasion in response to the loss of incentives. The pre-tax profits
of units in the zone were also found to be significantly higher than those of units outside, even
when both units were producing the same product in the same city, among investors who owned
two industrial units, one inside the zone and the other outside. Thus, the profits of the unit that did
not benefit from tax incentives were frequently much lower than the profits of the unit that did,
indicating a diversion of profits to the tax-exempt entity, when a company had two units, one of
which benefited from tax incentives while the other did not.
Therefore, tax holidays are a very blunt investment incentive, while other incentives could provide
benefits to taxpayers, encouraging investment. Such incentives, known as investment-linked or
performance-based incentives, include the following253:
•

“Investment tax credits. A fixed percentage of an investment is deducted from tax liability.”

•

“Investment allowances. A fixed percentage of an investment is deducted from taxable profit
(in addition to depreciation).”

•

Accelerated depreciation. Depreciation is permitted more quickly than is feasible for the rest
of the economy. There are many ways to accomplish this, such as by raising first-year
depreciation allowances or depreciation rates. Tax payments are unaffected in nominal terms,
but their net present value decreases and firm liquidity rises.

3.4.4 Path to Reform
Overall, the practice of providing incentives creates many risks. Among them, it might encourage
lobbying and rent-seeking, facilitate evasion, and exacerbate the challenges of administration. But
there are various steps governments can take to minimize or avoid these consequences. For
instance, increasing transparency on the costs and benefits of tax incentives would, in the long run,
better help shape future policy. Moreover, providing a level playing field to all businesses through
broad-based taxes and with reasonable rates has been the best investment incentive in many
countries.
Based on these considerations, the diagram below illustrates a progressive evolution towards a
sound, measured, and targeted use of tax incentives.
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Figure 17: Reform Path for Tax Policy and Administration254
Tax Policy

Tax Administration

Generous tax holidays

Discretionary/non-transparent
tax incentives

Partial tax holidays

Tax incentives in individual
agreements

Investment linked tax incentives
(investment credits, investment
allowances, etc.)

Improve transparency (publish
list of investors benefiting from
incentives)

Only indirect tax incentives for
capital inputs

Tax incentives in tax laws

Tax incentives only for anchor
investments

Tax incentives are available
without additional permission

Uniform reasonable tax rate over
a broad base

No tax incentives

Reproduced from James, 2013
3.5 Policy Challenges Relating to Financial and Other Nontax Incentives
The sections above focused on tax incentives. As compared with those types of measures, the costs
and benefits of financial and other non-tax incentives can be more difficult to track, measure, and
control.
Many of these difficulties with non-tax incentives are brought on by the fact that they take many
different forms, such as direct grants, lower real estate prices, and exemptions from regulatory
compliance. The variety of non-tax incentives can make cost calculations for them particularly
difficult. It can also be challenging to calculate benefits due to their policy objectives, particularly
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for behavioral incentives (incentives designed to encourage particular behaviors, like R&D
incentives and training incentives).
As opposed to tax incentives, which are usually only granted by taxation authorities, national and
subnational officials can grant numerous financial and alternative non-tax incentives as well as
collaborate with other government bodies to administer such incentives, adding yet another
challenge to accounting for all administered grants. 255
The likelihood of abuse is also increased because the majority of financial incentives are highly
targeted and may be given in a discretionary manner. As a result, it is more difficult to gather
accurate data, account for rent-seeking, and consider other political economy implications.
Additionally, it's possible that the political justifications for using financial incentives will prevail
over their economic justifications. 256
Together, these factors can complicate the process of evaluating and shaping the cost-benefit
profile of non-tax incentives beyond the challenges associated with tax incentives alone.
3.6 Concluding Remarks on General Best Practices for Government Design of Tax and
Other Incentives
Drawing from and building on the discussion in this section, the text below concludes by setting
forth 10 core principles that are considered international best practice in the area of investment
incentives.257
3.6.1 Principles Related to the Selection and Design of Incentives
Principle 1: Investment incentives should not be a primary economic development strategy but
rather a focused policy instrument meant to correct market failures.
Applies to: Tax and Financial Incentives
Rationale: Empirical studies and country experiences indicate that when incentives do play a role,
they are most influential when investors are wavering between like options in countries with
enabling environments that are conducive to investment. Due to the potential for rent-seeking,
competition distortions, high opportunity costs, and a “race to the bottom” within a nation or
region, the use of incentives should be calculated and cautious, and it is important to carefully
consider other policy options that might be more effective in achieving the same goals. Broadly
255
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speaking, investment incentives are often best leveraged to support the development of public
goods including investments in public infrastructure projects, health facilities, education and skills
upgrading, or targeted support during economic downturns.
Principle 2: Investment incentives, if used, should only be part of broader economic
development strategy.
Applies to: Tax and Financial Incentives
Rationale: If used, incentives should only be considered one policy instrument of a larger
government effort to address key investment objectives. In order to maintain investor confidence
and certainty, the messaging and policies related to incentives should not be frequently changed.
Principle 3: Investment incentives programs should be time-bound
Applies to: Tax and Financial Incentives
Rationale: Since incentives are meant to address specific market failures, they should be designed
to include sunset provisions. Tax holidays, in particular, create a community of businesses that
depend on these incentives and lobby for their continuation long after the benefits for the initial
period are granted. In many countries, it has been observed that tax holidays frequently continue
to exist in the legal space long after their original intended duration and the time at which they
would have provided any benefits would have expired. Thus, financial incentives should also have
a “sunset clause.” For matching grants, sunset clauses are not needed as those grants are one-time
payments. However, other financial incentives, such as loans, should have deadlines setting the
expected date for outcome achievement.
Principle 4: Investment incentives should be regularly reviewed to ensure relevance and
effectiveness.
Applies to: Tax and Financial Incentives
Rationale: Investment incentives should be regularly reviewed to determine their relevance and
economic benefits relative to their budgetary and other costs, including long-term impacts on
resource allocation.
When considering the role and effectiveness of incentives, governments should consider the
following key questions:
•

Would the investment come in anyway (even without an incentive)?

•

Would the incentive put existing businesses at a disadvantage (distort competition)?
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•

Would the incentivized investment realize tax revenues after the incentives are exhausted?

•

Does the incentivized investment provide positive externalities such as:
Ø direct jobs,
Ø new technology/skill upgrade,
Ø Infrastructure/public goods,
Ø new industry, or
Ø ancillary industries?

•

Does the incentive create opportunities for evasion or corruption?

•

Does the incentivized investment cause negative externalities such as pollution?

•

Would the incentive result in increasing demand for incentives by other investors?

•

How does the incentive affect equity and the distribution of benefits?

We encourage legislators to include details on these evaluations in the design of the program,
including details on who is responsible for the relevant data collection as well as the methodology
that will be used for the analysis.
Principle 5: Information on the processes and procedures, administration, management, and
dispersal of investment incentives should be transparent and publicly accessible.
Applies to: Tax and Financial Incentives
Rationale: Firms favor incentives that are transparent and easy to understand, and value certainty
in incentives policy. A country’s incentives regime should include practices that promote both
internal disclosure (within and between government institutions) and external disclosure (to
investors and the general public). Investors should have easy access to details about the different
incentive programs available, the qualifications and documentation needed, the maximum awards,
the award process and criteria, the duration of the award process, and the authority in charge.
Information on incentives should be gathered and shared by pertinent public institutions. A
centralized database should ideally contain all of the data, including beneficiary information,
budgeted amounts, and incentive values.
We also encourage transparency in the individual agreements between firms and the government,
as well as certification reports. States should build a public “database of deals” that includes all of
this relevant information.
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Principle 6: The process for applying for investment incentives should be simple and minimize
discretion. In the case of tax incentives, the approval process should be automatic.
Applies to: Tax and Financial Incentives
Rationale: Streamlined, well-coordinated procedures help minimize both administrative costs as
well as investor compliance costs. Country experiences show that automatic approval of tax
incentives (i.e., investors who meet the eligibility criteria for an incentive are automatically granted
that incentive) helps promote transparency and accountability, and encourages investor certainty.
As opposed to granting incentives on a case-by-case basis, automatic approval is the least
discriminatory and limits possibilities for bribes, so long as the eligibility criteria are objective and
clearly defined, and there is the capacity to monitor and enforce compliance. Tax authorities should
periodically carry out audits of cases where taxes have been claimed to minimize misuse.
Principle 7: Incentive programs should have a statutory cap, limiting the total dollars allocated
to a program.
Applies to: Tax and Financial Incentives
Rationale: Incentive programs can become extremely costly and encourage overuse without limits
on their spending. These spending caps also have a secondary benefit of requiring greater
transparency in the use of incentives.
Principle 8: Tax incentives should be linked as much as possible to investment level, and tax
holidays should be used as sparingly as possible.
Applies to: Tax Incentives
Rationale: International experiences demonstrates that tax holidays are generally less costeffective than investment-related tax incentives like investment allowances, investment tax credits,
and accelerated depreciation. They produce more deliberate motivations for growth because they
are linked to the amount of capital.
Moreover, and as described in greater detail above, although tax holidays are widely prevalent,
they present a range of limitations and risks.
Principle 9: Tax Incentives should be provided for in the relevant tax code (and not in other
statutes or agreements).
Applies to: Tax Incentives
Rationale: Keeping incentives in the tax law ensures the role of the legislature and administration
by the tax authority. It challenges the discretionary practice of creating individual agreements on
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the provision of incentives. Additionally, with the information consolidated in one law, it increases
transparency, reduces complexity (by minimizing potential confusion across multiple statutes and
agreements), and motivates coordination of the relevant government agencies on the incentives
offered.
Principle 10: Tax returns, tax declarations, and relevant tax forms should be filed on a regular
basis by investors as a pre-condition to benefiting from tax incentives.
Applies to: Tax incentives
Rationale: To support monitoring and evaluation, investors should be required to file tax returns
(even if the investors are receiving complete exemptions through their package of incentives). In
addition to identifying the incentives that the investor is receiving, the tax form should also collect
data on the approximate value of the incentives received. These values would support the
collection of budgetary data and tax expenditure calculations. They would also guide tax
authorities in carrying out audits of investors if automatic approval is adopted.
Principle 11: Tax expenditure statements should be prepared regularly to measure the costs of
the tax incentives.
Applies to: Tax incentives
Rationale: The regular preparation of tax expenditure statements fosters internal accountability
and sound budgeting practices. It also provides important data to assess the relative costs of
incentives (e.g., as a percentage of GDP, in relation to spending on other public goods, or in
relation to additional jobs provided by marginal investors).
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Section 4: Reducing Incentives Competition:
Regulatory Efforts to Limit ‘Races to the
Bottom’
There are several factors and trends driving the use of inefficient incentives:
•

Asymmetries in information and inequality in bargaining power between governments
and firms. Governments are sometimes unable to know what incentives packages
competing jurisdictions are willing to give.

•

The growing use of site consultants providing information on incentives offered by
different governments, which in some markets can strengthen those asymmetries and the
extractions of “rent” by firms.

•

Misalignment of costs and benefits, with the benefit of attracting an investment being
“booked” for the government officials in office at the time, but the costs often pushed off
onto future governments.

•

The absence of a counterfactual (i.e., the inability of a government to always know what
would have happened if it did not grant the incentive or provide a smaller incentive
package).

•

The increasing mobility of capital making it more difficult for governments to get
investments to “stick.”

While the winning location may reap near-term benefits from securing an investment, it does so at
a cost likely higher than it would have been absent any unnecessary incentives competition. This
can lead to a situation in which the offer and receipt of incentives becomes the norm, rather than
the exception, benefiting investors at the expense of general welfare.
Addressing these issues, however, is a problem of collective action. An individual city, state,
nation, or even region does not want to restrain its ability to use incentives to obtain an advantage
over other competing jurisdictions, particularly if other jurisdictions have not similarly committed
to restricting the use of incentives. When each actor pursues its own self-interest in the effort to
attract investment, it encourages a race to the bottom detrimental to all.258
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There are treaties that address these collective action problems and may restrict the use of tradedistorting practices caused by making certain government support or assistance impermissible. For
example, members of the WTO may invoke several of the WTO’s “covered agreements”259 to
discipline the use of investment incentives (both financial and regulatory) that government entities
may introduce to attract investment. These agreements were originally aimed at addressing issues
of cross-border trade and were not designed specifically to address the use of incentives to increase
investment (or support outward investment). However, their rules may apply to the granting of
certain subsidies, regulatory advantages, and State Aid used to attract investment. Two examples
are the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs Agreement),260 and the
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement).261 Outside the
WTO framework, there are the European treaties governing State Aid. There are also other recent
agreements designed to govern international investment that contain rules relevant to the use of
investment incentives. These instruments are discussed in more detail below.
4.1 The WTO TRIMs Agreement
The WTO Agreement on TRIMs disciplines the use by WTO members of trade-related
performance requirements applied as a condition of foreign direct and, in some cases, inward
investment. The context is not direct financial incentives per se (i.e., subsidies). Members can
invoke the TRIMs Agreement to limit the performance requirements that host states seek to apply
to inward and foreign investors, and this may have indirect financial implications. For example, in
the Indonesia – Autos dispute,262 Indonesia lost a case involving its attempt to condition the receipt
of import duty relief and import duty exemptions for parts and components, as well as certain sales
tax reductions for vehicles on the investor’s satisfaction of local content requirements. Such
performance requirements are widely perceived by WTO members as trade-restrictive or tradedistorting.
The TRIMs Agreement makes only a modest contribution towards disciplining performance
requirements. It clarifies the application of GATT rules on national treatment and the prohibition
of quantitative restrictions that arose in the FIRA GATT Panel Report.263 The FIRA report involved
performance requirements imposed by Canada on foreign investors. These conditions took the
form of local content and export performance requirements. The GATT panel determined that
Canada’s local content requirements violated the national treatment obligation present in Article
259
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III: 4 of GATT 1947264 but that its export performance requirements did not violate GATT rules.
The panel went to great lengths to emphasize that the issue before it was not Canada’s sovereign
right to regulate foreign investment, but instead the consistency of Canada’s trade measures
(“purchase and export undertakings”) with GATT rules.265 Nevertheless, the FIRA report has
considerable relevance with respect to the conditions that GATT contracting parties (now WTO
members) may impose on foreign investment. The WTO TRIMs Agreement, which is inspired by
the FIRA report, has similar relevance since the primary obligations are similar, if not identical.
By its own terms, the TRIMs Agreement only applies to trade in goods and not services.266 The
TRIMs Agreement does not define what constitutes a trade-related investment measure. Instead,
it reinforces the FIRA conclusion that Articles III: 4 and XI: 1 of the GATT are applicable to
TRIMs.267 In addition, pursuant to Article 2.2 of the TRIMs Agreement, the agreement
incorporates an annex containing an “Illustrative List” of trade-related investment measures that
violate Article III:4 and Article XI:1 of GATT 1994.
Illustrative List
1. TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in
paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable
under domestic law or under administrative rulings or compliance with which is necessary to
obtain an advantage, and which require:
(a) purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic
source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of
products, or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local production; or
(b) that an enterprise's purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount related
to the volume or value of local products that it exports.
2. TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of general elimination of quantitative
restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 include those which are
mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings or compliance
with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which restrict:
(a) importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production,
generally or to an amount related to the volume or value of local production that it exports;
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(b) importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production by
restricting its access to foreign exchange to an amount related to the foreign exchange inflows
attributable to the enterprise; or
(c) exportation or sale for export by an enterprise of products, whether specified in terms of
particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a proportion of
volume or value of its local production.

This Illustrative List constitutes the heart of the TRIMs Agreement. The TRIMs listed in paragraph
1 of the list violate Article III: 4 of GATT 1994. Paragraph 1(a) prescribes the use of local content
requirements. Paragraph 1(b) prescribes the use of trade balancing requirements that in effect
require the use of local content.
The TRIMs listed in paragraph 2 violate Article XI: 1 of GATT 1994. Paragraph 2(a) and 2(b) are
both “trade balancing” requirements. While paragraph 1(b) “deals with internal measures that
affect products after they have been imported,” “paragraph 2(a) deals with border measures
affecting the importation of products.”268 Paragraph 2(b) prohibits foreign exchange balancing
requirements applied to limit imports.
Paragraph 2(c) is consistent with Article XI: 1 of GATT 1994. It prohibits TRIMs involving
restrictions on the exportation of or sale for export by an enterprise, “whether specified in terms
of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a proportion of
volume or value of its local production.” Paragraph 2(c) deals only with measures that restrict
exports. The result, consistent with the FIRA decision, is that the Illustrative List does not apply to
other “measures relating to exports, such as export incentives and export performance
requirements.”269
Several WTO decisions have interpreted the TRIMs Agreement. A thorough examination is
beyond the scope of this report, but two points bear noting: (i) In EC – Bananas III the panel found
that the TRIMs Agreement “does not add to or subtract from” Articles III: 4 and XI: 1 of GATT
1994, but instead “clarifies that Article III: 4 may cover investment-related measures;”270 and (ii)
in Indonesia – Autos the Panel found that the TRIMs Agreement is not limited to measures
applicable to foreign investment. It also applies to advantages accorded to domestic investors since
they influence the treatment of foreign investment.271
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While the main focus of this chapter is on disciplining inefficient investment incentives,
particularly various subsidies that states may accord investors, investment incentives do not always
take the form of direct financial contributions. They can also be indirect in nature. WTO members
may invoke the disciplines of the TRIMs Agreement (and Articles III:4 and XI:1 of GATT 1994)
to oppose indirect financial benefits, such as import duty relief and import duty exemptions when
tied to local content requirements, trade balancing requirements, and exchange balancing
requirements.
4.2 The WTO SCM Agreement
The SCM Agreement governs the use of subsidies relating to trade in goods (not services). While
not specifically drafted as a means to discipline investment incentives, it may nevertheless serve
this function in certain circumstances. For example, one can imagine a scenario whereby a WTO
member offers a financial subsidy to a foreign automotive firm to entice it to locate a factory within
its territory. This type of subsidy would raise issues under the SCM Agreement.
The SCM Agreement is the only multilateral agreement containing a definition of a “subsidy.”
Under the SCM Agreement, a subsidy is generally defined as a “financial contribution,” or
“income or price support,” “by a government or any public body,” which confers a “benefit” on
the recipient.272 Financial incentives that do not meet the SCM definition of a subsidy are outside
the SCM Agreement.
One important element in the SCM Agreement’s definition of a subsidy is the meaning of a
“financial contribution.”273 In Article 1.1(a) (1), the SCM Agreement sets forth an exhaustive list
of the types of financial contributions that can be classified as subsidies. These are:
• a direct transfer of funds (e.g., grants, loans, and equity infusion), and a potential direct
transfer of funds or liabilities (e.g., loan guarantees);
• government revenue that is otherwise due is forgone or not collected (e.g., tax incentives
such as tax credits);
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• provision of goods or services (other than general infrastructure), or government purchases
of goods, at non-market prices; and
• government payment to a funding mechanism, or when government entrusts or directs to a
private body to carry out one or more of the three types of contributions addressed above.
Regulations (e.g., exemptions from compliance with certain environmental or technical standards)
that convey an indirect benefit to firms or industries are not on that list and are unlikely to fall
within the SCM’s definition of a subsidy. Nevertheless, in very limited circumstances they might
be prohibited under other WTO-covered agreements, such as the non-discrimination provisions in
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) and in the GATT (GATT
1994).274 These obligations are mentioned below.
The second core element of the definition of a “subsidy” under the SCM Agreement is that it must
confer a benefit or advantage on the recipient. A “benefit” or an “advantage” is defined in relation
to the normal costs and benefits occurring in the market. A benefit or an advantage is conferred if
the financial contribution “places the recipient in a more advantageous position than would have
been the case but for the financial contribution.”275
4.2.1 Regulation of Specific Subsidies
Even if a measure falls within the definition of a “subsidy,” this does not mean that the subsidy is
prohibited or restricted under the SCM Agreement. Whether and to what extent the subsidy will
be regulated depends on its “specificity.” Specificity refers to whether a subsidy is available only
a particular enterprise, industry, or group of enterprises or industries.276 By disciplining “specific”
subsidies, the SCM Agreement targets those subsidies that “cause distortions and inefficiencies in
international trade and [that], therefore, should fall under an international discipline. General
measures, such as the reduction of tax rates for an entire country or the creation of public
infrastructure, modify the market structure in the same way for all economic operators in the
market” and are not restricted.277
If a subsidy is “specific” it may fall into one of two categories, (1) prohibited subsidies, which the
SCM Agreement deems to be specific and flatly prohibits; and (2) actionable subsidies, which the
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SCM Agreement classifies as actionable, but not per se illegal. A third category, non-actionable
subsidies,278 expired on Dec. 31, 1999, with the effect that such subsidies are now actionable.279
Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement defines prohibited export subsidies as:
•

Subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions,
upon export performance; and

•

Subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of
domestic over imported goods.280

Pursuant to Article 3.1, prohibited subsidies consist of export subsidies and import substitution
subsidies. A member may challenge such subsidies without showing harm to its interests, and
WTO dispute settlement is subject to tighter time limits since injury is not an issue. There is a
philosophical similarity in the disciplines imposed under the SCM and TRIMs Agreement. Both
agreements discipline incentives that favor the use of local goods over imported goods.
The second category (actionable subsidies) includes specific subsidies that are not export subsidies
or agricultural subsidies. These subsidies are actionable in the event that they adversely affect other
members, including through:
•

injury to the domestic industry of another member;

•

nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other members
under GATT 1994; and

•

serious prejudice to the interests of another member.281
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If the SCM does not prohibit a subsidy, or if an actionable subsidy does not cause adverse effects,
it is outside the scope of the SCM Agreement.
4.2.2 Remedies for Unlawful Subsidies
The SCM Agreement provides a two-track approach for addressing unlawful subsidies. Pursuant
to Track One, members have the right to impose countervailing duties unilaterally in response to
subsidies that cause injury to their domestic industry.282 This is a fast and effective means of
redress as it allows a member to countervail an illegal subsidy through national procedures and
without recourse to WTO dispute settlement. Pursuant to Track Two, a member can seek
multilateral redress at the WTO, where a WTO panel or the Appellate Body acting through the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body, can recommend that a subsidy be removed. Multilateral redress
is the only available remedy when a subsidy harms a member’s exports to a third country or to the
subsidizing member.283
In conclusion, it is possible that, in certain cases, an investment incentive could involve a
prohibited subsidy. However, it is more likely that a case involving the WTO legality of investment
incentives would revolve around:
(i)

Whether another WTO member (not the grantor or the grantee of the specific subsidy)
can prove that an investment incentive causes injury to its domestic industry within the
meaning of the SCM Agreement. If so, the subsidy could be “countervailable” at the
national level;284 or

(ii)

Whether there is nullification or impairment or serious prejudice if a dispute involves
a member’s exports to a third country or to the subsidizing member (or injury to its
domestic industry. If so, such a measure could be capable of redress at the WTO.

4.2.3 Subsidies Used by Developing Countries
The SCM Agreement included many specific rules for developing country members, most of
which have now expired. Article 27.2(a), when read together with Annex VII, still permanently
exempts the least developed members from the prohibition on subsidies conditioned on export
performance, thus allowing them more flexibility to use export subsidies (which may not be within
their means). The SCM Agreement also sets out special rules regarding countervailing duties,
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broadening the category of subsidies offered by developing country members that are deemed to
be de minimis, and not subject to countervailing duties.285
4.2.4 Notification and Review
Article 25 of the SCM Agreement requires that members disclose all specific subsidies on an
annual basis. Any member may ask another for additional information about its subsidies and, if
the requested member does not comply, the matter may be brought to the attention of the
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
4.3 WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA)
To what extent would government financial incentives applied to attract agricultural investment
fall within the disciplines of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture? The legal situation is complex,
further complicated by the fact that the AoA was not written as an investment agreement, but as a
means to accomplish three goals: (i) increased market access for agricultural producers,286 (ii)
increased discipline on domestic support granted by members to their agricultural producers,287
and (iii) increased discipline on export subsidies accorded agricultural producers.288 Nevertheless,
it is conceivable that the AoA might apply, in very limited circumstances, to certain investment
incentives that a WTO member might offer to attract or retain an agricultural producer.
Why should the AoA apply while the SCM Agreement does not? Pursuant to Article 21, the AoA
trumps other WTO-covered agreements dealing with trade in goods. As the AoA takes a more
lenient approach to export subsidies and domestic support programs,289 investment measures (to
the extent that they might fall within the AoA) might receive greater protection. When the Peace
Clause290 was in effect, agricultural export subsidies in conformity with the AoA were not
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prohibited or actionable, but could be countervailed.291 With respect to domestic support,292 green
box293 subsidies were not actionable and could not be countervailed. Amber box294 and blue box295
measures were countervailable, but were not actionable if they did not exceed 1992 levels.296
With the expiry of the Peace Clause, the situation is less clear. One view is that export subsidies
that are in accord with the AoA are still legal but may be actionable.297 Domestic support measures
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that are in conformity with the AoA are actionable under the SCM Agreement, but require a
showing of specificity and adverse effects.298
In conclusion, certain agricultural investment incentives, in the form of the export subsidies and
domestic support measures described above, might fall within the disciplines of the AoA and the
SCM. The fact situation seems unlikely to occur, but the possibility does exist.
4.4 The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
The TBT Agreement seeks to ensure that technical regulations, standards, and conformity
assessment procedures are applied in a manner that is non-discriminatory and does not create
unnecessary obstacles to international trade, while assuring that WTO members have sufficient
policy space to achieve legitimate objectives, such as protection of the environment, national
security, consumer protection, as well as the protection of human health or safety, or animal or
plant life or health.
As with the AoA, the TBT Agreement was not drafted as a means to discipline investment
incentives. There are no WTO disputes arising under the TBT Agreement that involve investment
incentives in the form of regulatory advantages specifically accorded foreign or national investors.
Again, such disputes, while conceivable, are unlikely to arise under the TBT Agreement.
There are two distinct scenarios that could conceivably arise with respect to technical regulations
applicable to investors. The first scenario would involve a WTO member agreeing to waive a
domestic environmental law governing air pollution from a factory that would operate in the
member’s territory if a foreign investor agrees to locate the factory there. This decision would be
within the national sovereignty of that member and would not involve a violation of the TBT
Agreement. Such a situation is also unlikely to violate the SCM Agreement for the reasons
mentioned above.
The second scenario would involve a WTO member seeking to attract investment, for example, an
automotive plant, and in doing so, agreeing to waive national laws regulating automotive emission
and fuel consumption for vehicles produced by that plant and sold within its territory. This scenario
would fall within the TBT Agreement and would constitute a violation of the TBT Agreement if
foreign automobiles had to satisfy a higher standard in order to be sold within the member’s
territory.
Were such a dispute to arise, it would involve a violation of the non-discrimination rules of Article
2.1 of the TBT Agreement (more specifically, the national treatment requirement), as well as a
violation of the national treatment requirement present in Article III: 4 of GATT 1994. Three recent
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Appellate Body decisions involving the TBT Agreement (collectively known as the “Trilogy
cases”)299 set forth the applicable rules under the TBT Agreement for determining whether there
is impermissible discrimination. Assuming that foreign and domestic automobiles are like
products,300 the regulating member would not be permitted to accord less favorable regulatory
treatment to imported automobiles,301 unless it is done in an even-handed manner and the
detrimental impact is the result of a legitimate regulatory distinction (such as protection of the
environment or human, animal and plant life or health).302 As the TBT Agreement is more specific
than GATT 1994, pursuant to WTO practice, it is unlikely that the Appellate Body would
subsequently examine an investment measure that is found to violate Article 2.1 of the TBT under
Article III: 4 of the GATT.303
In conclusion, it is conceivable that an investment measure involving a technical regulation could
fall under the TBT Agreement. If so, under the Appellate Body’s present interpretation of the TBT
Agreement, it is likely that a discriminatory measure that accords less favorable treatment to
foreign products, or among foreign products, would violate the TBT Agreement in cases where
there is a legitimate regulatory distinction beyond economic gain.
4.5 WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATS304 covers trade in services through four distinct “modes of supply” that are based on the
location of the service supplier and the manner in which services are provided.305 “Mode 3” covers
trade in services through the commercial presence of a service supplier from one member in the
territory of any other member. Mode 3 is, in effect, a form of foreign direct investment. As a result,
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GATS is relevant with respect to the disciplines that members may impose on service-related
investment incentives.
Nevertheless, two areas are carved out from the GATS, meaning that GATS disciplines, including
any rules applicable to subsidies, do not apply: (i) to services supplied in the exercise of
governmental authority,306 and (ii) to [air] “traffic rights, however granted;” “or services directly
related to the exercise of traffic rights, except as provided in paragraph 3 of this Annex.”307
Article XV of the GATS, titled “Subsidies,” contains no rules restricting the use of subsidies.308 It
contains little more than a mandate for continued negotiations. Other GATS provisions, however,
are relevant and may have a stronger disciplining effect on investment incentives.
Article II, the most-favored nation provision, restricts a member’s ability to treat foreign investors
from one WTO member less favorably than foreign investors (like service and service suppliers)
from another WTO member. This obligation applies to all measures (including the provision of
subsidies) and service sectors unless the government adopting the measure has listed an
appropriate exemption in its List of MFN Exemptions, or unless the country involved is an adjacent
country and the measure is designed to “facilitate exchanges limited to contiguous frontier zones
of services that are both locally produced and consumed.”
Article XVII, the national treatment provision, restricts a member’s ability to treat foreign
investors less favorably than domestic investors with respect to an investment in services. This
obligation only applies to service sectors that a member has listed in its schedule. For those sectors
that are scheduled, a member has the right when formulating its service schedule to negotiate an
exception enabling it to grant different treatment to foreign and domestic investors. Poretti notes
that “the applicability of National Treatment to subsidies is confirmed by para. 9 of GATT
Document MTN.GNS/W/164, 3 Sep. 1993 ‘Scheduling of Initial Commitments in Trade in
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domestic service suppliers.
2. Any member that considers that it is adversely affected by a subsidy of another Member may request
consultations with that Member on such matters. Such requests shall be accorded sympathetic consideration.
An omitted footnote provides that: “A future work programme shall determine how, and in what time-frame,
negotiations on such multilateral disciplines will be conducted.”
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Services: Explanatory Note,’ stating ‘Article XVII applies to subsidy-type measures in the same
way that it applies to all other measures …’”.309 Poretti further notes that:
[T]he Explanatory Note provides at para. 10 that “There is no obligation in the GATS which requires a
Member to take measures outside its territorial jurisdiction. It therefore follows that the national
treatment obligation in Article XVII does not require a Member to extend such treatment to a service
provider located outside the territory of another Member”. The Explanatory Note clearly reduces the
territorial scope of the National Treatment provision for the purpose of subsidies. Accordingly, Members
are not requested to extend positive measures to services or service suppliers located outside of their
territory. National Treatment nevertheless applies to foreign investment (or Mode 3 of Supplycommercial presence) in the financial services sector, regardless of the form and organization of the
investment vehicle.”310

Through the application of Article XVI on market access, WTO members commit to allowing
investors from other WTO members to invest in their domestic service sectors. Absent such a
commitment, there is no obligation to allow a foreign firm to establish or operate a presence within
its territory. Krajewski observed that subsidies do not need to be scheduled in the market access
column of a member’s service schedule, even if the subsidy effectively limits market access. He
also notes that if subsidies discriminate between domestic and foreign service suppliers, they need
to be scheduled in the national treatment column.311
In conclusion, despite the unhelpful language in Article XV, the GATS does in fact contain a
number of provisions that are relevant with respect to disciplining service-related investment
incentives.
It is outside the scope of this report to analyze the effectiveness of the WTO Agreement as a means
to restrict investment incentives, to evaluate the compatibility of the types of measures identified
in Sections 2 and 3 of this report with the WTO Agreement, and to identify gaps in the WTO
Agreement that remain to be filled. Instead, the goal of this section is to demonstrate that when
viewed holistically, the WTO Agreement does provide a limited number of disciplines that may
permit WTO members to discipline investment incentives, thereby limiting, at least to a certain
extent, races to the bottom resulting from the use of investment incentives by the members.
4.6 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Rules on State Aid
In addition to the global rules of the WTO, there are region-specific frameworks governing the use
of subsidies and incentives, including, most notably, those used by the EU. The overarching rules
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on State Aid are currently set forth in Articles 107 through 109 of the TFEU. These provisions are
brief and provide limited guidance, so communications, guidelines, and decisions by the European
Commission, as well as judgments of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), play a crucial role in
elaborating the substantive content of the standards. There is now a relatively robust body of law
governing the use of State Aid and providing guidance regarding when and under what
circumstances it will be allowed, including with regard to support for inward and outward
investment.
Through the application of these rules and guidelines, granting of State Aid by European countries
has been in decline, as explained in Section 2. Constituting roughly 2 percent of GDP in the 1980s,
they now are roughly 0.81 percent of GDP.312
4.6.1 EU Definition of State Aid
As noted in Section 2, State Aid regulated by EU law is (Article 107(1)): (1) aid, in any form
whatsoever, which confers an advantage or benefit for the recipient; (2) granted by a member state
or through state resources; (3) that distorts or threatens to distort competition by favoring certain
undertakings313 or the production of certain goods; and (4) affects trade between member states.
All four elements must be met for government assistance to count as State Aid.
Contribution of state resources. Decisions of the ECJ interpreting the rules on State Aid have held
that it must involve a direct or indirect transfer of state resources, or a charge on the public
account.314 Price and income supports not paid through public funds would consequently not
constitute State Aid, nor would actions by the government directing a private body to make a
payment or forgo income otherwise due.
Advantage. To determine whether the recipient has been granted a benefit or advantage requires
application of a market test – i.e., determining whether the same advantage would have been
available under market conditions. Advantages can be granted through a wide range of
312
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interventions, including through government participation in a company’s capital; the granting of
loans or guarantees; tax relief; exemptions from social welfare charges; provision of goods or
services; and payment for goods and services.
Selectivity. The advantage must favor certain undertakings or the production of certain goods or
services. Hence, subsidies that are granted to individuals, or general measures open to all
enterprises, are not prohibited and do not constitute State Aid (e.g. general taxation measures or
employment legislation). However, “a measure that is open to all sectors may be selective if there
is an element of discretion by the awarding authorities,” and if the scheme applies to only part of
the territory of a member state (this is the case for all regional and sectoral aid schemes).315
4.6.2 Regulation of Specific Subsidies
Support meeting the definition of State Aid is generally considered to be incompatible with the
common market of the EU and not allowed unless it is aimed at one of several community
objectives or corrects certain market failures.
Article 107(2) of the TFEU lists three categories of State Aid that are always permitted, in order
to achieve certain policy goals of the community. These include:
•

aid with a “social character” granted directly to individual consumers, as long as it is
granted without discrimination relating to the origin of relevant products (e.g., tax
deductions for low-income or disabled persons, or tax benefits for the purchase of lowcarbon products);

•

aid to repair damage caused by natural disasters or other exceptional occurrences; and

•

aid granted to certain parts of Germany to compensate for the economic consequences of
the former division of the country.

Article 107(3) provides that there are several other objectives that may, in certain cases, also
warrant the use of State Aid. In this case, the commission has discretion regarding whether to
authorize State Aid targeting any one of these policy goals:

315

•

Furthering economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low
or where there is serious underemployment as compared to EU averages (Art. 107(3)(a)).

•

Promoting important projects of common European interest (e.g., construction of a power
plant to provide energy to other EU members, construction of infrastructure linking EU
states, the formulation of industrial standards, and environmental protection) or correcting

EU State Aid Scoreboard. 2018. See also for more, EU State Aid Scoreboard 2020.
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a serious disturbance in the economy of a member state that affects the state as a whole (as
opposed to just certain regions or sectors) (art. 107(3)(b)).
•

Facilitating the development of certain economic activities or certain economic areas
(regions that are economically disadvantaged relative to the state in which they are
located), provided that such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent
contrary to the common market (Art. 107(3)(c)).

•

Promoting conservation of culture and heritage (Art. 107(3)(d)).

•

Achieving other goals specified by decision of the council acting on a proposal by the
commission (Art. 107(3)(e)).316

The Commission has issued guidelines specifying the criteria that must be satisfied for aid under
Article 107(3) to be allowed.317 The criteria include:
•

contribution to a well-defined objective of common interest;

•

need for state intervention: A State Aid measure must be targeted towards a situation where
aid can bring about a material improvement that the market cannot deliver itself, for
example by remedying a market failure or addressing an equity or cohesion concern;

•

appropriateness of the aid measure: the proposed aid measure must be an appropriate policy
instrument to address the objective of common interest;

•

incentive effect: the aid must change the behavior of the undertaking(s) concerned in such
a way that it engages in additional activity that it would not carry out without the aid or it
would carry out in a restricted or different manner or location;

•

proportionality of the aid: the aid amount must be limited to the minimum needed to induce
the additional investment or activity in the area concerned;

•

avoidance of undue negative effects on competition and trade between member states: the
negative effects of aid must be sufficiently limited, so that the overall balance of the
measure is positive;
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•

transparency of aid: member states, the Commission, economic operators, and the public,
must have easy access to all relevant acts and to pertinent information about the aid
awarded thereunder.

In addition to these overarching principles, for each of the types of potentially permissible
categories of State Aid referred to in Article 107(3), the Commission and the ECJ have developed
more specific guidance regarding the scope and nature of support that may be allowed.
For instance, to determine whether to authorize regional aid, the Commission has developed
precise rules that specify appropriate levels of aid intensity. These levels vary based on the extent
of the economic disadvantage in the targeted region as well as the size of the investment. The more
severe the economic situation in the relevant region, the greater the allowed aid intensity will be.
The maximum aid intensity for SMEs can be greater than it is for large firms. If the investment
project is deemed a “large investment project” because it exceeds a threshold value, the maximum
aid intensity is lower than the standard maximum allowed for investment support in that region
and will be further lowered as the value of the investment increases. Commission guidance also
provides that regional aid is generally only permitted to support establishment of a new enterprise
or the expansion, diversification, or upgrading of an existing one. Regional aid is only rarely
allowed if it is designed to cover operating expenses of an existing investment.
Application of these rules has led to the withdrawal of several investment incentives. For instance:
[T]he Commission in 2005 informally indicated to the Irish government that it would not
approve a proposed €170 million aid to Intel for a €1.6 billion chip fabrication plant at
Leixlip, and the Irish authorities withdrew the aid notification. … Similarly, in 2008 an EU
decision … to open an investigation of a proposed investment subsidy of €37.4 million to
steel-maker Dunaferr prompted Hungary to withdraw the aid proposal. And in 2002, the
UK withdrew a proposed ₤17.4 million aid to Ford after the commission opened an
investigation under [State Aid regulations].318
4.6.3 Notification and Review
With certain exceptions, member states must notify the European Commission and seek prior
approval of new State Aid they intend to grant or amendments to existing State Aid. Elements that
must be disclosed in the notification include the authority granting the subsidy, the intended
beneficiaries, their locations and sectors, the amount, form and source of the aid, and its objectives.
The exceptions to these requirements for prior notification and approval are for:
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•

State Aid covered by a “block exemption”;319

•

de minimis aid, defined as aid to a single undertaking that does not exceed the value of
200,000 euros over a three-year fiscal term assessed on a rolling basis;320 and

•

individual aid granted pursuant to an “aid scheme”321 that had already been notified to and
authorized by the Commission.

These exceptions apply to the majority of State Aid, and the block exemption is increasingly being
used by the Member States. In 2019, 1473 new block exemption measures were put in place,
accounting for 95.5% of all new State aid measures. In other words, roughly 95.5% of aid provided
to industry and services was granted based on programs covered by a block exemption or
previously approved aid schemes. 322 Furthermore, Member States are now implementing large
block exemptions schemes for a variety of goals.
In addition to the disclosure requirements regarding new aid and amendments to existing aid,
member states must also provide annual reports to the Commission on their existing aid schemes.
4.6.4 Penalties and Remedies
The Commission has significant powers to monitor compliance with its decisions and the State
Aid rules. It can conduct on-site monitoring relating to existing aid programs and review whether
schemes in place continue to comply with relevant rules. Then, in cases where a member state has:
(1) not notified a State Aid, and that aid is later determined to be incompatible with the common
market; or (2) notified the State Aid and obtained approval, but implemented the aid in a manner
contrary to the decision approving it, the Commission may order the member to terminate the
scheme and take all steps necessary to recover aid already granted.323
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4.7 Intra-African Agreements
Various regional and economic blocks in Africa have made attempts at harmonizing their tax
regimes and disciplining subsidies.324
One example is the effort toward tax harmonization in the West African Economic and Monetary
Union (WAEMU). The eight members of this union have agreed on directives harmonizing various
aspects of their tariff and tax regimes, including, in 2009, rules on income taxation. One recent
study found, however, that WAEMU countries are granting investment incentives undermining
those harmonization objectives. Whether acting through law or contract, officials in WAEMU
countries are taking advantage of institutional weaknesses and gaps in the relevant rules to give
investments deals that deviate from their standard tax regimes, increasing the opacity and
complexity of the tax systems, and “contributing to a culture of ‘tax negotiation.’”325
The treaty establishing the five-member East Africa Community (EAC) evidences its state parties’
aims to harmonize and rationalize their investment incentives326 and tax policies.327 EAC member
states have also recently made progress towards a “Code of Conduct Against Harmful Tax
Competition” to harmonize member states’ tax incentive regimes. That code, which is yet to enter
into force, aims to formalize an existing arrangement whereby each year the finance ministers of
the five countries that make up the EAC meet before their budget speeches are made and discuss
their budget proposals. This provides the opportunity for finance ministers to dissuade other
members if they propose any new tax incentive that puts other countries at a disadvantage. The
Secretariat, through a series of studies, is currently working to drive investment harmonization by
unifying the incentive packages offered to investors within the member states and removing the
disparity among investors.328
The Common Market for Eastern and South Africa (COMESA) also integrates regulations
regarding incentives in the legal notice establishing its rules. It defines subsidies, and lists tax
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incentives as among the types of financial contributions that fall within that definition.329 It
requires each COMESA member state to notify the other member states of any subsidies granted
or maintained that directly or indirectly distort competition among countries in the common
market.330 It also allows COMESA to impose countervailing duties on products imported into the
COMESA common market by third countries to offset the effects of subsidies granted by those
countries.331
Last, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is encouraging harmonization and
cooperation among its member states, notably through Annex 3 to the Finance and Investment
Protocol.332 That annex, titled “Co-operation in Taxation and Related Matters,” requires state
parties to, among other things:
•

“endeavor to achieve a common approach to the treatment and application of tax
incentives”;333

•

“endeavor to avoid … harmful tax competition”;334

•

“endeavor to avoid … introducing tax legislation that prejudices another State Party’s
economic policies or activities of, or the regional mobility of goods, services, capital or
labor”;335

•

“ensure that tax incentives are provided for only in tax legislation.”336

Article 4 of the annex further requires the states to “develop and adopt guidelines for tax incentives
in the Region” and establish a “fiscal framework for tax incentives” aiming, among its objectives,
to address the effectiveness of proposed tax incentives in achieving their policy goals, and
assessing costs and impacts of measures within individual states employing them and within the
region.337 It stipulates “good practice Guidelines to avoid harmful tax competition & cost benefit
analysis to protect regional revenue.” To focus efforts towards implementing tax coordination,
ministers for finance and investment of the member states endorsed the formation of three technical
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working groups, one of which is the Tax Incentives Working Group, engaged in studying and
developing guidelines for the governance of those measures in SADC.338
4.8 International Investment Treaties
International investment treaties are bilateral and multilateral instruments designed for the
promotion and protection of international investment.
There are several connections between investment treaties and investment incentives that make
these instruments relevant and important for the international governance of FDI incentives. Both
investment treaties and investment incentives are instruments used by governments to attract
investment and promote outward investment. Investment treaties may even be seen as one form of
regulatory investment incentive, aiming to influence investment decisions by providing investors
additional substantive and procedural legal protections, and restricting host countries’ abilities to
interfere with their investments. Both instruments, however, are also criticized as not being
effective in achieving their intended goals, or if effective, being effective at too high a price, and
with that price raising equity concerns, as it constitutes a transfer of wealth from the public to the
private sectors.
Aside from these broad overlapping features, there are important connections between investment
treaties and incentives. Investment treaties may be driving and locking in the use of incentives, but
they also can and, to a limited extent already do, regulate the use of such supports.
4.8.1 Investment Treaties’ Role in Driving and Locking in Use of Incentives
Investment treaties affect capital mobility and intensify competition among governments to attract
more footloose capital through use of incentives. While many investment treaties only offer
protection to foreign investment already within a state’s borders, a growing number of them
provide foreign investors with rights to enter a foreign market and establish a commercial presence
there, guaranteeing the ability of investments and investors to freely transfer capital across borders.
Additionally, broadly phrased definitions of “investments” and “investors” have been interpreted
to protect investors and their overseas investments irrespective of whether the investor has
substantial or real ties with the home country, or whether its foreign investment has made a lasting
commitment to the host country. Investment treaties thus facilitate and protect the free movement
of capital across borders, even where this may run counter to states’ needs for long-term, stable
investment that can provide a reliable tax base, employment, and other benefits.
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When incentives are granted to attract or keep this investment, investment treaties may lock them
in irrespective of their efficiency or effectiveness in meeting policy goals or shifts in the needs,
priorities, and resources of governments. After a government establishes an incentive program, it
may wish to modify or eliminate that program if it runs into budget shortfalls, comes across new
challenges and priorities, or determines that the incentives are not efficient or effective. Investment
treaties, however, may limit governments’ abilities to amend or remove incentive programs once
in place.339 Foreign investors have alleged that the “fair and equitable treatment” (FET) standard
and the obligation to pay compensation if there is any expropriation of an investor’s property –
both of which are common obligations in investment treaties – are breached as a result of changes
in incentives.340
While some awards evaluating and judging the merits of these claims have not yet been issued,
others illustrate that shifts in incentives policies can give rise to state liability. In PSEG v. Turkey,
for example, the tribunal found that the government violated the treaty’s FET obligation when it
apparently became concerned about, and decided to back away from, previous signals that it would
provide what could have been costly financial support to a proposed energy project.341 Similarly,
in Micula v. Romania, the tribunal determined that the government breached the FET standard by
removing certain incentives offered to firms in order to attract investment.342
What best explains the gravity of such a discussion is what happened after Spain changed its feedin tariff system, which it implemented to promote renewable energy generation in the first place.
In 2010, Spain began to change its renewable energy incentive regime as it was found to be no
longer cost-efficient. This has prompted a number of arbitral claims alleging that such a change in
the regulatory space violates the FET standard. As of September 2021, 22 arbitral decisions had
been issued in what has become known as the "Spanish renewables saga," with more than 50 cases
filed under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT).
For instance, in the RREEF v. Spain case, in which an investment fund from the United Kingdom
and Luxembourg brought a claim targeting the Spanish reforms in 2013, the tribunal found that
Spain has breached its FET obligations by changing the old Feed-in-Tariff regime, as “obligation
to create a stable environment certainly excludes any unpredictable radical transformation in the
339
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conditions of the investments.”343 While the majority of the Spanish Saga tribunals acknowledging
that the FET standard does not give the right to regulatory stability per se, the Eiser v. Spain
tribunal went on to determine to what extent treaty protection, as well as the FET treatment
provided in the ECT, could be invoked and result in a right of compensation as a result of a State's
acknowledged regulatory rights.344 The tribunal concluded that the FET obligation entails
providing fundamental stability in the essential characteristics of the legal regime that investors
rely on when making long-term investments.345 The Antin v. Spain tribunal also adopted the Eiser’s
approach and found that the FET standard includes a requirement to provide fundamental stability
in the “essential characteristics of the legal regime relied upon by investors in making long-term
investments.”346 Both the Antin and Eiser tribunals concluded that, feed-in tariff regimes, as part
of an incentive scheme, constitutes an essential characteristic of the legal regime relied upon by
investors in making long-term investments. This approach ultimately described the policy choice
of Spain in changing its incentives schemes as a treaty violation, no matter whether the said policy
choice is actually found to be reasonable or economically and socially justifiable.
Even if not ultimately successful, the initiation of the cases alone can be costly for governments to
defend and may have a “chilling effect” on governments, making them reluctant to change unwise
or costly incentives programs. Also, the reviewed decisions tend to confirm that the ECT provides
overly broad protection against regulatory changes to "investors." No doubt, such broad protection
may entail undermining the inherent police power of sovereigns, and enhancing the welfare of
taxpayers of the host states.
Investment treaties can also effectively encourage the use of incentives through provisions stating
that a government may only impose certain performance requirements on investors if they are
imposed as a condition for the investor to obtain or receive an advantage.347 Such requirements
may be to procure services locally or train or employ workers.
4.8.2 Investment Treaties’ Regulation of Incentives
In addition to indirectly or directly driving the use of incentives by facilitating increased capital
mobility and potentially restricting changes in the relevant legal framework, investment treaties
contain some provisions that can discipline their use. For one, most agreements contain
343

RREEF Infrastructure v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30, Decision on Responsibility and on the Principles of
Quantum (30 November 2018), paras 315 and 379: unreasonable and disproportionate changes are understood as
“drastic and radical change” affecting “unexpectedly” the conditions of the investments.
344
Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg S.à.r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No ARB
13/36 (Award 4 May 2017)
345
Id., 360.
346
Antin Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l and Antin Energia Termosolar B.V v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID
Case No ARB 13/31 (Award 15 June 2018)
347
2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America
and The Government of [Country] Concerning The Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment. 2012,
Art. 8. [hereinafter “2012 U.S. Model BIT”].

103

nondiscrimination obligations that prevent states from treating covered foreign investors less
favorably than similarly situated domestic investors or investors from third states. These provisions
could restrict the use of selective subsidies that favor one or some enterprises over others. While
some have argued that discrimination must be on account of nationality in order to be prohibited,
cases indicate that de facto and unintentional discrimination are also actionable.348
A number of states – primarily developed countries with relatively elaborate treaties such as the
U.S. and Canada – have (1) specifically carved out subsidies and grants from the scope of these
obligations, (2) safeguarded measures in force at the time of the treaty’s conclusion that might be
inconsistent with the nondiscrimination obligations, or (3) inserted policy-related exceptions, all
of which can enable them to provide selective state supports. However, many states, mostly
developing countries, have not included these narrowing provisions, and thus could be subject to
claims by investors and the other state party or parties to the treaty that their subsidies are
inconsistent with the investment treaties’ nondiscrimination provisions.
Some agreements more directly restrict certain types of incentives, but provide only weak, if any,
mechanisms to enforce those obligations. In particular, a growing minority of investment treaties
includes provisions stating that the contracting parties should not or must not reduce or fail to
enforce environmental or labor standards in order to attract investment. These provisions aim to
prevent countries from competing for investment by reducing regulatory burdens on investors. The
2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), for instance, states:
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by weakening or
reducing the protections afforded in domestic environmental laws. Accordingly, each Party
shall ensure that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from or offer to waive or otherwise
derogate from its environmental laws in a manner that weakens or reduces the protections
afforded in those laws, or fail to effectively enforce those laws through a sustained or
recurring course of action or inaction, as an encouragement for the establishment,
acquisition, expansion, or retention of an investment in its territory.349
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by weakening or
reducing the protections afforded in domestic labor laws. Accordingly, each Party shall
ensure that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from or offer to waive or otherwise
derogate from its labor laws where the waiver or derogation would be inconsistent with the
labor rights referred to in subparagraphs (a) through (e) of paragraph 3, or fail to effectively
enforce its labor laws through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, as an
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encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion, or retention of an investment
in its territory.350
The model states that these obligations apply not only to investments by those foreign investors
covered by the treaty, but to all investments within a host country’s territory.
In contrast to other provisions in investment treaties, however, there are limited or no mechanisms
for enforcing these obligations. The 2012 U.S. Model BIT, quoted above, only requires the states
to consult with each other regarding issues arising under those articles,351 and affirms that states
may (but are not required to) “provide opportunities for public participation regarding” relevant
matters.352 The obligations regarding labor and the environment are neither subject to mechanisms
for investor-state dispute settlement nor state-state dispute settlement.353
Moreover, the types of “races to the bottom” targeted by these provisions are only a subset of the
legal and regulatory races that can occur due to countries’ efforts to attract and retain mobile
capital. States may, for instance, simply agree to pay investors for any additional costs they incur
as a result of new environmental or labor legislation. They may also compete for capital by offering
tax or financial incentives, or agreeing to provide land, infrastructure, or other resources on
preferential terms. While not constituting offers to derogate from environmental or labor law, these
incentives can erode states’ resources, transfer public resources to private entities, and have
similarly detrimental impacts on societal welfare and policy objectives.
A third way in which investment treaties regulate the use of incentives is through their provisions
on regulatory transparency. These may require all levels and branches of government to disclose
any laws, regulations, procedures, rulings and decisions relating to investment, as well as any
relevant laws, regulations, or procedures proposed for adoption.354 These obligations thus can be
used to mandate disclosure of programs and grants of investment incentives. Like the rules on nonderogation from environmental and labor standards, these regulatory transparency obligations can
now be found in some relatively modern agreements, but are still only in the minority of the treaties
that have been concluded and, where included, are often not subject to dispute settlement.
Finally, a fourth way investment treaties might address the use of incentives is through the
incorporation of standards and guidance developed by the OECD and UN on the conduct of
multinational enterprises (see Box 10 below). There have been some efforts and calls to include in
investment treaties obligations on firms to comply with such standards and guidelines.
Noncompliance could then be relevant to a state’s liability to an investor in the case of disputes
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regarding the removal of or modifications to incentives. It could give rise to claims or
counterclaims or cause the investor to lose the benefits of the treaty.355
The TTIP negotiations on a trade and investment treaty had potentially offered an opportunity to
regulate investment incentives more effectively, and any renewed attempts at that deal should
similarly provide a platform for greater cross-border engagement on these issues. While the EU
has rules restricting its member states’ abilities to provide investment incentives, the U.S. largely
lacks similar regulations. It thus seems likely that European states would have concerns that a new
investment liberalization and protection agreement would more fully expose them to efforts by the
50 U.S. states and thousands of U.S. municipalities to outbid European locations for new projects
and use incentives to encourage European businesses to relocate operations. European states and
the Commission might also be concerned as to whether orders for firms to repay subsidies would
be deemed to breach treaty protections such as the obligation to provide fair and equitable
treatment.356 Disciplines on the use of incentives in such an agreement could, however, potentially
avoid or curb those cross-Atlantic battles.
Box 10: International Standards on Firms’ Activities Seeking and Obtaining Incentives
International instruments address the role of businesses in seeking and obtaining incentives. Two
examples are the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (the “Guidelines”)357 and the
UN Principles for responsible contracts (the “Principles”).358
The Guidelines are recommendations provided by governments to enterprises operating in or from
adhering countries, which now number more than 40.359 Though formally directed at multinational
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enterprises,”360 they also represent “good practice for all” and thus generally apply to foreign and
domestic firms alike.361
Relevant to the issue of incentives, the Guidelines state that enterprises should “refrain from
seeking or accepting exemptions not contemplated in the statutory or regulatory framework related
to human rights, environmental, health, safety, labor, taxation, financial incentives, or other
issues.”362 Notably, the Guidelines not only recommend against requests for certain financial, tax,
and regulatory incentives, but also discourage passive receipt of those benefits.
While the Guidelines disclaim that they are “voluntary and not legally enforceable,” adhering
countries have made a binding commitment to implement them and have instituted mechanisms
such as the system of National Contact Points in order to promote the effectiveness.363
The second instrument, the UN Principles for responsible contracts, which was developed under
the mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, provides recommendations to ensure
that contracts between investors and states, including contracts containing incentive packages, are
consistent with the state’s duty to protect human rights and the firm’s responsibility to respect
them.
Principle 4 is relevant to the practice of granting regulatory incentives that provide investors with
exemptions from or compensates them for changes in the generally applicable legal regime. The
principle declares that states and investors should ensure that “contractual stabilization clauses, if
used, [are] carefully drafted so that any protections for investors against future changes in law do
not interfere with the State’s bona fide efforts to implement laws, regulations or policies in a
nondiscriminatory manner in order to meet its human rights obligations.”364 The Principles observe
that stabilization clauses that could frustrate human rights include provisions freezing fiscal terms,
as well as those restricting, or requiring compensation for, changes in laws relating to health,
protection of the environment, labor and safety.365
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4.9 National and Subnational Efforts to Regulate Competition for Investment Through Use of
Incentives366
Thus far, we have reviewed cross-national efforts to restrain incentive competition. In many
countries, subnational competition is fierce and the use of incentives is providing no national
benefits in terms of investment attraction. For example, in the United States there is competition
across states, and often competition between communities within a state for investment.367 This
process has been heavily criticized in the United States where, in a survey of economists through
the University of Chicago Booth School, experts were asked if offering local tax incentives to
firms benefited the United States as a whole. Only 5% agreed with this statement.368 Civil society
groups in the U.S., such as Good Jobs First, have attempted to document this “jobs piracy” and to
encourage cities and states to sign non-aggression pacts.
Examples abound of states, provinces, and municipalities competing to attract investment outside
of the United States. Countries such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Vietnam, and the
United States all have been noted for the costly bidding wars that have been conducted within their
territories to attract new investment or pull investment from one part of the country to another.
Some of these countries, or subnational units within them, have consequently taken steps to govern
such conduct, while in others, the issue remains largely unregulated.
In Canada, poaching, or the use of incentives to cause an investment to move from one location
to another, has driven action:
[P]oaching (usually called “piracy” in the United States) was a major problem in the 1990s,
with Nova Scotia and Manitoba both losing existing call centers to New Brunswick, and
Crown Life Insurance moving 1200 headquarters jobs from Toronto to Regina in 1991 with
a C$250 million provincial loan guarantee. It was in this context that the Code of Conduct
on Incentives was agreed in July 1994 as part of the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT),
whose parties include the federal government, all 10 provinces, and two of the country’s
three territories. The Code (Annex 607.3) explicitly prohibited relocation subsidies in
Article 3, Prohibited Incentives (Internal Trade Secretariat, 1994):
‘No Party shall provide an incentive that is contingent, in law or in fact, and would
directly result in an enterprise, located in the territory of any Party, relocating an
existing operation into its territory.’
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Moreover, under Article 4, Avoidance of Certain Incentives, the governments agreed to
make “best efforts” to avoid bidding wars; however, unlike Article 3, this was not legally
binding.
That agreement remains in force but, according to Thomas, has had little effect: Only one
complaint of poaching has been raised under the AIT, and that dispute was not resolved;369
poaching of investments from one province to another has continued, albeit on a smaller scale.370
More recently, the two Canadian provinces of Alberta and British Columbia entered into the Trade,
Investment, and Labor Mobility Agreement that has, since its entry into force in 2007, broadly
banned business subsidies provided by all levels of government in the two provinces.371
Apart from these inter-provincial agreements, there has been increased regulation of competition
by local government authorities, with eight of 10 provinces prohibiting municipalities from
granting incentives.372
Thomas reports a similar story in Australia:
In Australia, bidding wars and poaching were also considered to be a problem for the states
and territories. In 2000, South Australia offered auto parts firms A$15,000 per job to
relocate from Victoria. The following year, Victoria returned the favor by offering A$2
million to South Australia parts maker Castalloy. Reform movements started as early as
1996, when the Community and Public Sector Union endorsed a New South Wales
government initiative to end the poaching and bidding wars, and an Industry Commission
report criticized state incentives and recommended that they be cut back or abolished
entirely. The Industry Commission’s successor, the Productivity Commission, published
further estimates of state incentive spending in 2002. Following this, five of the country’s
six states (New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, and Western Australia),
plus the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), reached an
agreement in 2003 to end bidding wars among them. In addition, the parties provide annual
reports to each other on their investment attraction. Queensland was the only state that
refused to go along. Stimulated in part by an A$100 million subsidy to Fox News in
Sydney, the signatories banned relocation incentives and pledged not to use subsidies for
investments that were clearly coming to Australia. The three-year agreement was renewed
for another five years in 2006.
While the agreement was relatively weak, in that it had no mechanisms for monitoring or enforcing
the parties’ commitments, did not include all states, and did not require publication of incentives,
369
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it nevertheless may have been effective. There were reports that implementation of the agreement
helped reveal cases of businesses overstating offers of incentives from competing jurisdictions,
resulted in a drop in the number of requests for relocation incentives, and saved the states millions
of dollars.373 When the agreement expired in 2011, however, it was not renewed.
In the United States, the 50 states and the municipalities within them compete fiercely for
investment. And, although some states have regulations requiring the provision of investment
incentives to be disclosed or restricting intra-state competition by municipalities, many do not.374
At the federal level, the constitutional doctrine of the “dormant commerce clause” may restrict the
use of some investment incentives.375 Additionally, federal law prevents states and municipalities
from using federal funds to poach investments from other locations. Overall, however, U.S. law
contains no comprehensive restrictions on inter-state or intra-state investment incentives.
4.10 Summary and Trends Regarding the International, National, and Subnational Regulation
of Incentives
Table 8 compares different regulatory initiatives on the criteria of requirements, obligation of
reporting, and enforcement mechanisms. The text below the table provides additional points of
comparison and cross-initiative analysis.
Table 8: Summarizing Initiatives of Supranational/Federal Governance of Incentives376

Initiative

Requirements

Mandatory
reporting?

Enforcement

WTO
SCM
Agreement

Restricts use of specific
subsidies relating to trade in
goods.

Yes

Enforcement is initiated by members
unilaterally or through a complaint
procedure using the WTO’s dispute
settlement mechanisms.
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IIAs

Relevant
provisions
in
articles
on
nondiscrimination,
labor,
environment, performance
requirements,
and
transparency, but no general
restrictions on State Aids or
investment incentives.

No

Limited mechanisms are available to
challenge
actions
to
attract
investment
by
lowering/notenforcing environmental or labor
standards in order to attract
investment.
Some
treaties
permit
subsidies/incentives to be challenged
if discriminatory.
Rules on transparency requiring
disclosure of incentives might be
subject to state-state mechanisms.

EU

Comprehensive
rules
restricting State Aid that
generally
ban
tradedistorting
investment
incentives but allow them for
certain
policy
goals,
including development of
disadvantaged
regions;
support
for
research,
development and innovation;
employment and training;
environmental protection;
energy conservation; and
development of renewable
energy.

Yes

Commission plays a significant role
in enforcement. There are repayment
obligations for unlawful aid.
Other interested natural and legal
persons may also bring actions to
challenge decisions approving or not
approving aid.
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Canada

Provinces: Per Code of
Conduct on Incentives,
provinces barred from using
relocation incentives and
must use “best efforts” not to
engage in bidding wars. All
10 provinces have agreed.

Yes
(but
reports not
made
public)

Code of Conduct Contains a
complaint procedure. It has only been
used once (in an anti-poaching claim
filed by British Columbia in 1996).
The dispute was never resolved, and
no other poaching case has since been
raised.

Yes
(but
reports not
made
public).

Agreement did not contain any
mechanisms for enforcement.

Two provinces (Alberta and
British Columbia) entered
into a separate agreement
banning business subsidies
at all levels.
Municipalities: eight of 10
provinces
prevent
municipalities from granting
incentives.

Australia –
Inter-state
Cooperation
Agreement
(expired
2011)
•

Banned
relocation
incentives; states pledged
not to use subsidies to attract
investment already coming
to Australia.

Main objectives of different models: The WTO’s SCM Agreement focuses on restricting
government measures that distort trade in goods between member states. The EU’s rules
on State Aid are broader than those under the WTO in that they are not limited to measures
impacting trade in goods, but also narrower in several ways. They only govern supports
that constitute a charge on the public account and affect EU member states; IIAs generally
prevent discriminatory subsidies on a broad multi-sectoral basis, and, in contrast to the
EU’s rules, may also restrict use of regulatory incentives, even though such incentives do
not necessarily require state resources or a charge on the public account. Subnational rules
regarding investment incentives entered into by states and provinces, to the extent they
exist; seem to largely be centered on combating the specific issue of poaching. Moreover,
some agreements, such as the 1951 Paris Treaty and the WTO’s AoA are entirely sectorspecific, while others, such as the TFEU, allow some flexibility for sector-specific rules.
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•

Policy Space:
o Regulation of subsidies and investment incentives generally targets only those
measures that are specific or selective, allowing governments to retain freedom to
establish legal and economic frameworks attractive to investments more generally,
and to attract investment through efforts such as comprehensive infrastructure
development and education and training.
o International regulation of subsidies by the WTO and within the EU contains
various carve-outs protecting even specific and trade-distorting subsidies designed
to correct market failures and advance legitimate policy goals such as promotion of
development in low-income states or areas of high unemployment, investment in
R&D, and investment aiming at environmental protection. Subsidies used to
advance such projects can incorporate various tools, including monitoring and
reporting requirements and penalties or claw-back provisions, in order to ensure
that the costs of the incentives result in the desired benefits.

377

•

Consideration for disadvantaged areas: Some institutions, such as those established by the
WTO and the EU’s rules on State Aid, contain special rules of application for states, and
even regions within states, that are relatively disadvantaged, and thus might have (1)
greater need to use incentives to attract investment, but (2) lesser resources to provide such
incentives (particularly if they have to compete against incentive packages offered by
wealthier jurisdictions).

•

Enforcement mechanisms: The most effective rules and enforcement mechanisms are
found in systems where there is some form of vertical hierarchy and an independent
institution or body at or near the top of that hierarchy, capable of assessing whether rules
are being complied with and awarding compensation or assigning penalties for breach. The
WTO’s dispute settlement system plays this role;377 and within the EU, the Commission
and ECJ serve these functions. The EU’s system additionally allows private actors to
initiate actions challenging violations of State Aid rules. At the national level, a federal or
central government can establish rules and sanctions with which provinces and states must
comply while provinces and states, in turn, are able to set rules governing the conduct of
the municipalities within their borders. Horizontal agreements and commitments are less
effective unless, as is done in the context of investment treaties, an independent body has
the power to determine compliance and determine remedies.

•

Transparency: Instead of, or in addition to, regulating the use of investment incentives,
some efforts have been dedicated to promoting their transparency, requiring either ex-ante

With states also given unilateral rights of action via their power to impose countervailing duties.
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notice (and approval), as in the case of the EU’s State Aid rules, or ex-post notification, as
in the case of the SCM Agreement.
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Conclusion
The use of investment incentives has relevant implications for many important issues facing us
today, including tackling climate change; harnessing and leveraging the power of foreign direct
investment for sustainable development; combating unfair competition harmful to consumers;
limiting corruption and rent-seeking that can drain resources and wealth from the public; managing
costly competition among states for investment; aligning private and public interests on issues of
environmental protection, human rights, and conditions of work; addressing issues of inequality,
particularly as these are exacerbated by certain crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic; and
designing the transparent and workable legal frameworks that can advance those aims in a manner
that is equitable and ensures appropriate accountability.
This report provides a broad overview, illustrating past and current trends in state practice relating
to incentives, and the corresponding policy challenges. It also describes approaches explored to
date for addressing those issues at the subnational, national, and international levels.
A fundamental issue that limits the ability to survey the use of incentives is that there is relatively
little data reflecting the extent to which governments are using incentives, which types and how
much they are providing, to what firms, and under what conditions.
One reason for the lack of information is that, in many countries across all regions, investment
incentives are provided on a discretionary and non-transparent basis, rather than being granted
automatically and openly. Moreover, they are often granted through a range of vehicles.
Governments may provide incentives through different laws, tax codes, administrative rules or
decisions, and contracts. The range of incentives – which can include such diverse measures as
regulatory stabilization provisions, price supports, subsidized loans, preferential tax accounting
treatment, and development of dedicated infrastructure – further complicates the task of mapping
the landscape of these tools.
While some studies focus on identifying a particular subset, such as tax and financial incentives,
others, such as reports based on data from EU State Aid figures, only count measures that have or
are likely to have trade-distorting effects in the EU common market. Thus, although the figures
from the EU stand out in that they provide a relatively comprehensive set of information regarding
the use of incentives due to mandatory reporting requirements and the public release of
information, they leave many open questions regarding the use of incentives in that region.
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While recognizing these challenges, this study nevertheless compiles research done by various
bodies to at least paint a picture of currently documented trends and practices.
Early studies on incentives by UNCTAD found them to be widely used, with tax incentives being
the most common and financial incentives being granted less frequently. Recent research by the
World Bank, UNIDO and the Asian Development Bank on incentives identifies financial
incentives as being most prevalent in developed countries, which have shifted away from tax
incentives. In contrast, developing countries more commonly provide tax incentives, particularly
tax holidays that do not require upfront outlays of funds from the government. Tax and duty
exemptions through SEZs are used across all regions.
Data on State Aid from the EU illustrates that the type of incentive granted can also vary depending
on the purpose for which the aid is given. This finding might reflect more careful tailoring of
incentives programs, and a reflection of the fact that whether and to what extent a particular
incentive will influence an investment decision often depends not only on the type of incentive
that is offered, but also on the nature of the business and industry that is receiving it.
Indeed, for market-seeking investments, strategic asset-seeking or natural resource-seeking
investments, studies commonly report that the grant of incentives does not have much or any
impact on the investor’s decision to invest. Efficiency-seeking investments may be more
responsive to government incentives, but also may be more “footloose” and able to relocate easily
once the incentives expire or better incentives are offered by a competing jurisdiction.
Understanding the utility of incentives and their impact on investment decisions is crucial as these
supports impose costs on governments that not only can be substantial in absolute terms but can
also potentially outweigh any direct or indirect benefit that might arise as a result of their use.
Thus, to avoid wasting public resources, governments should analyze the costs and benefits of
their incentive policies.
One approach highlighted in this report for calculating the costs and benefits of tax incentives is
measuring the jobs created as a result of the tax incentives. This is calculated by the jobs created
by marginal investors (those who would not have invested without receiving incentives) over the
revenue forgone from non-marginal investors (who would have invested even without incentives).
Though the revenue cost per job created does not cover all costs, or all benefits of a given incentive,
it provides a rough figure that can help policy makers decide if the incentives are worthwhile.
To be cost-effective, governments should align their incentive policies with the specific
characteristics of their jurisdiction, and their short-term and long-term objectives.
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Beyond the actual cost of any given incentive, it is also important to highlight that they can give
rise to a plethora of issues and risks, such as encouraging lobbying and rent-seeking, facilitating
evasion, and creating administrative burden. Financial incentives present unique challenges
compared to tax incentives as they come in varied forms and tend to be administered by different
entities. In addition, as most of them involve monetary transfers, they are more prone to the risk
of capture.
To help maximize the cost-effectiveness of incentives and minimize their potential risks and
administrative burdens, this report offers a range of principles to guide their design and
implementation:
•

Investment incentives, both tax and financial, should only be used as focused instruments
to correct market failures, as second-best policy options, after having evaluated the
available alternatives.

•

Incentives programs should be part of a broader and consistent investment attraction
strategy.

•

Incentives programs should be time-bound.

•

Incentives programs should be regularly reviewed to ensure their relevance and
effectiveness.

•

Information programs on the processes and procedures related to incentives’ administration
should be transparent and publicly available.

•

The process for applying for incentives should be simple and minimize discretion, and for
tax incentives it should be automatic.

•

Incentive programs should have a statutory cap, limiting the total dollars allocated to a
program, similar to financial incentives.

With specific regard to tax incentives:
•

They should be linked, as far as possible, to investment level, while tax holidays should be
used sparingly.

•

They should be provided in the relevant tax code.

•

Tax returns, declarations, and relevant forms should be filled out on a regular basis as precondition for investors.
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•

Tax expenditure statements should be prepared regularly to measure the costs of the tax
incentives.

In addition to taking steps within their own jurisdictions to better discipline and track the use of
incentives, governments can also take steps to combat the inter-jurisdictional “races to the bottom”
that can occur when they use incentives to compete for increasingly mobile capital. There are a
number of initiatives at the international, national, and subnational levels that address these issues
to at least some extent.
WTO Agreements, for instance, focus on restricting government measures that distort trade in
goods and services between member states; the EU’s rules on State Aid are broader in that they
are not limited to measures impacting trade in goods, but narrower in that, most obviously, they
only prohibit incentives that affect or may affect trade among EU member states. International
Investment Agreements (IIAs) generally prevent discriminatory subsidies or other preferences on
a broad, multi-sectoral basis but, to date, have not been widely used to challenge incentives
programs or measures. Subnational rules regarding investment incentives entered into by states
and provinces, to the extent they exist, seem to be largely centered on combating the specific issue
of “poaching.”
One challenge of designing systems to regulate the use of incentives is to balance rules restricting
those measures against the desire to use them in order to achieve certain policy goals. For instance,
restrictions in the SCM Agreement and in the EU rules on State Aid only prohibit specific or
selective measures, leaving governments room to establish legal and economic frameworks
attractive to investments more generally, and to attract investment through efforts such as
comprehensive infrastructure development, and education and training.
In the EU, even specific and trade-distorting subsidies may be allowed if they advance certain aims
such as promotion of development in low-income states or areas of high unemployment,
investment in R&D, and investment aiming at environmental protection. Subsidies used to advance
such projects can incorporate various tools, including monitoring and reporting requirements and
penalties or claw-back provisions, in order to ensure that the costs of the incentives result in the
desired benefits.
Another challenge with regulation of incentives is how to make the requirements effective. The
most successful rules and enforcement mechanisms, not surprisingly, are found in systems where
there is some form of vertical hierarchy and an independent institution or body at or near the top
of that hierarchy capable of assessing whether rules are being complied with and awarding
compensation or assigning penalties for breach.
The WTO’s dispute settlement system and the EU Commission and ECJ serve these functions,
with the latter authorizing private actors to initiate actions challenging violations of State Aid rules.
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Alongside those enforcement mechanisms, transparency has also been promoted with the
requirement either of ex-ante notice (and approval) as in the case of the EU’s State Aid rules, or
ex-post notification as in the case of the SCM Agreement. Through its rules on disclosure and
procedures for investigation and enforcement, the EU’s framework for governing State Aid stands
out as being relatively robust as compared to other efforts to regulate incentives. This, in turn,
appears to have translated into reduced levels of State Aid, lower aid intensities, and a shift toward
the use of horizontal aid.
In sum, while current knowledge regarding the use of investment incentives is limited, this report
seeks to lay the foundation for renewed attention to the use of incentives. Collective action is
required, as individual jurisdictions acting alone fear – often mistakenly – that they will lose out
to competing jurisdictions if they curtail their use of incentives.
Against that backdrop, the report identifies the following concrete areas for action:
•

Increasing the transparency of investment incentives.

•

Transitioning to a rule-based rather than ad hoc and discretionary system for granting
incentives.

•

Building capacity and ensuring available resources for performing proper cost-benefit
analyses and ensuring those analyses are systematically performed when making decisions.
Incentives should not dilute, eliminate, or even outweigh the potential benefits of an
investment project.

•

Ensuring incentives arrangements build in mechanisms for monitoring, oversight, and
enforcement so that when incentives are granted, they actually advance the intended policy
objectives.

•

Making sure that incentives, when used, are properly designed to meet the needs of their
intended investor beneficiaries.

•

Designing systems that are simple and manageable for administrators and users alike.

•

Working cooperatively to restrict the use of public funds to “poach” an investment,
drawing it from one location to another.

•

Developing cooperative strategies to prevent disadvantaged regions with limited resources
from having to compete with wealthier regions that can easily outbid them in the quest for
investment.
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•

Preventing the excessive use of incentives such as certain stabilization clauses that create
unduly inflexible legal and fiscal regimes and give rise to tensions between the interests of
governments, firms, and citizens.

•

Ensuring that there is policy coherence across different legal regimes, whether
supranational, regional, national or subnational.

Work is and has been proceeding on each of these issues in different fora at local, national, and
international levels. There are some examples of regulatory frameworks aiming to ensure that
incentives are appropriately tailored to promote long-term, sustainable and inclusive growth. These
could be both broadened and strengthened. Opportunities are also ripe to address these issues in
the context of the ongoing global initiatives to strengthen governance of international economic
activities, including tax cooperation, business and human rights, climate change negotiations, and
rules on investment promotion and protection.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: What Is Market Failure?
A market failure is when the market does not lead to an economically efficient outcome.
Externalities, imperfect information and coordination problems all lead to market failure.
Externalities: Externalities occur when market players do not fully pay or benefit from the
consequences of their actions on other actors in society. For instance, in the case of polluting
through industrial activity, market players may not have to pay for the full social cost of their
actions (negative externalities). In the case of research and innovation, market players may be
deprived of the full benefits of their actions (positive externalities).
Public goods: These are goods beneficial for society but generally not provided by the market,
given that nobody should be excluded from their use. This can be the case of national defense,
some types of public broadcasting, schools, and water infrastructure.
Imperfect information: This leads to transaction costs, agency costs, and moral hazard, which in
turn lead to inefficient market outcomes. This is often the case in regulation of the market by
government agencies.
Coordination problems: These problems occur in the field of standards setting, in transport
infrastructure, or in the area of innovation.
Market power: Monopolies and lack of a competitive environment often drive up prices and limit
supply.
Initial risk: High levels of initial risk with unknown benefits often lead to market failure. This is
especially the case for R&D and innovation, public goods, or extractive industries. Arguments in
favor of infant industry are often made from the above building blocks (imperfect capital markets,
the ‘appropriability’ argument, or market power/scale arguments).
Dynamic market failures: Current market prices might discourage businesses to invest in certain
branches of production even with prospects of high and sustainable rates of profit in the future.
However, prices send the wrong signal because as investment proceeds and unit costs decline with
increased output and external economies of scale, a country could acquire a comparative advantage
in an expanding industry.
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Appendix 2: Review of Case Studies of EU Regional Aid
Appendix Table 1: Investment Determinants, Aid Intensities in EU Case Studies on Regional Aid
2007-2013378

Source: Le Den, Xavier, Robert Kröber, Alessandro Ramella Pezza, Fritz Gillerke, Lukas Bresser, Matías Krämer,
Usman Khan, Jose Olivas. 2012, 154.
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Source: Le Den, Xavier, Robert Kröber, Alessandro Ramella Pezza, Fritz Gillerke, Lukas Bresser, Matías Krämer,
Usman Khan, Jose Olivas. 2012, 160.
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